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Selectively Disciplining Advocates
BRUCE A. GREEN
After lawsuits challenging the results of the 2020 presidential election
failed spectacularly, some wondered whether the plaintiffs’ lawyers would
be disciplined for filing frivolous complaints. Time will tell. But, if these
lawyers are not disciplined, one should not be surprised. This Article
presents an empirical study of the New York disciplinary process, which
confirms that advocates who violate disciplinary rules by overzealously
pursuing their clients’ interests, such as by making frivolous claims, are
rarely punished in the disciplinary process. That is because disciplinary
prosecutors, operating in secret, have discretion as to whether to bring
formal charges against lawyers who violate the rules. They ordinarily
exercise that discretion by weeding out cases involving advocacy
misconduct that they regard as minor or that they believe to be better
addressed by trial courts.
Employing the allegedly frivolous election challenges as an illustration,
this Article argues that disciplinary charging discretion raises four
questions that the legal profession and the public should give greater
consideration: whether rule drafters should remove rarely-enforced
advocacy rules from the disciplinary codes; whether disciplinary agencies
are under-enforcing advocacy rules; whether disciplinary authorities are
arbitrary or unprincipled in selecting whom to prosecute for advocacy
misconduct; and whether disciplinary authorities should be more
transparent about how they make charging decisions so that the public can
better understand whether advocacy rules, and authorities’ exercise of
discretion in enforcing them, serve the public interest.
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Selectively Disciplining Advocates
BRUCE A. GREEN *
INTRODUCTION
After futile legal challenges to the results of the 2020 presidential
election, some wondered whether the plaintiffs’ lawyers would be
disciplined. Trial and appellate courts were highly dismissive of the
plaintiffs’ factual and legal grounds for asking courts in swing states to block
state officials from certifying the election results.1 While there is ordinarily
nothing wrong with filing unsuccessful lawsuits on behalf of clients who
want their day in court,2 the rules of professional conduct forbid advocates
from filing pleadings that are legally or factually frivolous.3 Citing these
*
Louis Stein Chair and Director, Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University School of
Law. The empirical research in this Article was initially presented at a 2018 workshop on “The
Regulation of Lawyers through Disciplinary Systems.” My thanks to the International Institute for the
Sociology of Law (IISL) in Oñati, Spain for hosting the workshop; to the organizers, Kay-Wah Chen and
Judith McMorrow; and to the other participants for comments on the research presented there. Also, my
thanks to Lonnie Brown, Leslie Levin, and Eli Wald for comments on an earlier draft, and to the Michael
B. Carlinsky, Esq. Research Fund for supporting work on this Article.
1
For example, in Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, the court rejected a request to
invalidate millions of mail-in ballots, observing: “[T]his Court has been presented with strained legal
arguments without merit and speculative accusations, unpled in the operative complaint and unsupported
by evidence. In the United States of America, this cannot justify the disenfranchisement of a single voter,
let alone all the voters of its sixth most populated state. Our people, laws, and institutions demand more.”
502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020). See generally William Cummings, Joey Garrison & Jim
Sergent, By the Numbers: President Donald Trump’s Failed Efforts to Overturn the Election, USA
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-effortsoverturn-election-numbers/4130307001/ (Jan. 6, 2021, 10:50 AM) (stating that out of sixty-two election
challenges, plaintiffs prevailed in only one, involving a narrow procedural claim). Plaintiffs’ lawyers
were sanctioned for frivolous election challenges in two cases. See King v. Whitmer, No. 20-13134, 2021
WL 3771875, at *41 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2021) (holding that sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel were
warranted for filing the lawsuit in bad faith and for an improper purpose, imposing monetary sanctions,
and referring the lawyers to the disciplinary authorities); O’Rourke v. Dominion Voting Sys. Inc., No.
20-cv-03747-NRN, 2021 WL 3400671, at *31–32 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2021) (imposing monetary sanctions
on plaintiffs’ counsel for filing legally frivolous claims and failing to conduct an adequate factual
investigation). In rejecting efforts to overturn the election results, courts did not invariably find that the
challenges were frivolous, however. See, e.g., Trump v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620,
639 (E.D. Wis. 2020) (“While plaintiff’s disputes are not frivolous, the Court finds these issues do not
remotely rise to the level of a material or significant departure from Wisconsin Legislature’s plan for
choosing Presidential Electors.”).
2
See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 898 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1990) (“A distinction must be drawn
between a position which is ‘merely “losing”’ and one which is both ‘losing and sanctionable.’”).
3
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended 2020) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES] (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
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rules, prominent lawyers asked the New York disciplinary authorities to
sanction Rudolph “Rudy” Giuliani for filing a legally and factually baseless
lawsuit in Pennsylvania;4 Michigan’s Governor and Attorney General asked
the disciplinary authorities of Michigan and Texas to disbar Sidney Powell
and three other lawyers for bringing a frivolous claim to overturn Michigan’s
presidential election results;5 a group of Arizona lawyers urged their state’s
disciplinary authorities to sanction twenty-one lawyers, licensed both in and
outside the state, for frivolous submissions in ten different baseless
challenges to Arizona’s election results;6 the Georgia Bar Association
reportedly initiated a complaint against Lin Wood, alleging that he engaged
in misconduct in election challenges in multiple states;7 a federal judge in
the District of Columbia referred a lawyer to the disciplinary committee for
it to determine whether he should be disciplined for filing an election

unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”).
4
See Letter from Scott Harshbarger, Chairman, Laws. Defending Am. Democracy, Inc., to Att’y
Grievance Comm., Sup. Ct. of the State of N.Y., App. Div., First Jud. Dep’t (Jan. 20, 2021) (available at
https://ldad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/LDAD-Attorney-Grievance-Committee-Complaint.pdf)
(requesting that the Attorney Grievance Committee suspend Giuliani’s license to practice law while
investigating his conduct); Letter from Ronald C. Minkoff, Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz PC, to Jorge
Dopico, Chief Counsel, Att’y Grievance Comm., First Jud. Dep’t (Jan. 21, 2021) (available at
https://images.law.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/389/125082/Rudy-Complaint-Past-Presidents.pdf)
(requesting that Giuliani be disciplined for his role in various frivolous lawsuits). Both complaints alleged
other misconduct as well, including publicly making false statements about the election results. See
ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., STATEMENT OF NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION
CONCERNING GRIEVANCE COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST RUDOLPH GIULIANI 1–2, 11 (2021),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2021223-GiulianiStatement.pdf (describing allegations
of multiple professional conduct rule violations filed with disciplinary authority against Giuliani). In June
2021, a New York appellate court suspended Giuliani’s law license on an interim basis pending
disciplinary proceedings based on “uncontroverted evidence that [he] communicated demonstrably false
and misleading statements to courts, lawmakers and the public at large in his capacity as lawyer for
former President Donald J. Trump and the Trump campaign in connection with Trump’s failed effort at
reelection in 2020.” In re Giuliani, 146 N.Y.S.3d 266, 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021). However, the court’s
decision made no reference to allegations regarding frivolous claims. Id.
5
See Hailey Konnath, Mich. Gov. Wants Sidney Powell, 3 Other Attys Disbarred, LAW360 (Feb.
1, 2021, 10:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/legalethics/articles/1350956/mich-gov-wants-sidneypowell-3-other-attys-disbarred?nl_pk=745c9e54-9841-4658-9953-e35eef22b47a&utm_source=newslet
ter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=legalethics&read_more=1&attachments=true
(“Michigan
Gov. Gretchen Whitmer said . . . that Powell ‘did not just tiptoe near a precarious ethical line—she
outright crossed it.’”).
6
Letter from Dianne Post, Bob McWhirter, Roxana Bacon, Brendan Mahoney, Gail Gianasi Natale,
Amelia Craig Cramer & Victor Aronow to the State Bar of Ariz.: Disciplinary Dep’t (Dec. 16, 2020)
(available at https://blogforarizona.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/New-Ethics-Complaint-to-the-Bar12-16-20.pdf).
7
Aaron Keller, Here’s What We Learned from Lin Wood’s 1,677-Page ‘Confidential’ Georgia
State Bar Disciplinary Grievance, LAW & CRIME (Feb. 18, 2021, 7:09 PM), https://lawandcrime.com/
2020-election/heres-what-we-learned-from-lin-woods-1677-page-confidential-georgia-state-bar-discipline
-grievance/. For example, the bar’s complaint reportedly asserted that Wood filed a civil complaint in
Arizona “alleg[ing] that the election process was riddled with fraud and illegality” but “presented little
to no relevant or reliable evidence in support of [these] claims.” Id.
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8

challenge in bad faith; and the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, appointed by
the Supreme Court of Texas, instructed the Office of the Chief Disciplinary
Counsel of the state’s bar to investigate a citizen’s complaint that the state’s
Attorney General filed a frivolous election challenge in the U.S. Supreme
Court.9 Most significantly, a federal district court in Michigan, in addition
to imposing sanctions, ordered the Clerk of the Court to send its decision to
the disciplinary authority of the various jurisdictions in which the various
attorneys for the plaintiffs are admitted.10 In general, the disciplinary
complaints were predicated on judicial findings that the various lawyers’
filings were woefully lacking; no evidence supported their allegations of
widespread election fraud, and no legal arguments plausibly justified their
requests that the courts overturn the election results.
However, it is uncertain whether the plaintiffs’ lawyers will be disbarred,
suspended, or even so much as publicly reprimanded for bringing frivolous
lawsuits. State disciplinary prosecutors may decline to file charges, even if
they believe that the plaintiffs’ lawyers violated a disciplinary rule governing
advocates’ conduct.11 As this Article discusses, disciplinary authorities
typically do not bring charges for advocacy misconduct that they regard as
minor or as better addressed by trial judges. Among the rules that disciplinary
authorities rarely enforce are those forbidding advocates from filing frivolous
complaints and making other frivolous assertions in court.12 One might debate
8
Wis. Voters All. v. Pence, No. 20-3791 (JEB), slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2021) (“[T]he relief
requested in this lawsuit is staggering: to invalidate the election and prevent the electoral votes from being
counted. When any counsel seeks to target processes at the heart of our democracy, the Committee may well
conclude that they are required to act with far more diligence and good faith than existed here.”).
9
Letter from Jenny Hodgkins, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Couns., Tex. Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals, to
Kevin Moran (May 27, 2021) (available at https://aboutblaw.com/X1f).
10
King v. Whitmer, No. 20-13134, 2021 WL 3771875, at *41 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2021). In a
federal case in Colorado where defendants sought sanctions, the district court ordered two lawyers for
the plaintiffs to pay close to $187,000 in legal fees, finding that “this lawsuit has been used to manipulate
gullible members of the public and foment public unrest” and “has been an abuse of the legal system and
an interference with the machinery of government.” O’Rourke v. Dominion Voting Sys. Inc., No. 20-cv03747-NRN, 2021 WL 5449070, at *9 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2021). However, the court did not refer the
lawyers to the disciplinary authority. Id.
11
See, e.g., Jacob Shamsian, Could Sidney Powell Be Disbarred for Her Conspiracy Theory
Election Lawsuits? Experts Say She’s ‘Playing with Fire.’, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 6, 2021, 10:27 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/could-sidney-powell-be-disbarred-for-election-lawsuits-conspiracytheories-2020-12 (quoting different experts’ views on whether Sidney Powell will be disciplined for
frivolous filings); Jacob Shamsian, Will Rudy Giuliani Be Disbarred? Probably Not for Trump’s Election
Lawsuits, Experts Say., BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2020, 7:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/canrudy-giuliani-be-disbarred-election-lawsuits-trump-ukraine-investigation-2020-11 (quoting different experts’
views on whether Rudy Giuliani will be disciplined for frivolous filings and dishonesty). Lawyers may
be sanctioned by courts or punished by disciplinary bodies under somewhat different standards for filing
frivolous claims. See Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 832–33 (2004) (comparing ABA Model
Rule 3.1 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11).
12
See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through
Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1586–87 (2001) (stating that Rule
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whether, in any given case or class of cases, disciplinary authorities are
exercising laudable self-restraint or falling down on the job. But it is hard to
judge since the disciplinary decision-making process is confidential and the
authorities do not publicly acknowledge, much less justify, their decisions not
to pursue discipline.13 This is the practice not only in highly visible litigation,
but in hundreds of less noticed cases where disciplinary authorities exercise
discretion to let advocates’ misconduct go unpunished.
Lawyers’ critical role in society necessitates public confidence that the bar
is well-regulated through state disciplinary processes, which are the principal
mechanism for overseeing lawyers. State courts adopt rules of professional
conduct to govern the conduct of lawyers whom they license, and they may
punish lawyers if they find, at the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, that
the lawyers violated the rules. But disciplinary counsel, like criminal
prosecutors, may decline to bring charges even when they find that
wrongdoing occurred, and they exercise such discretion in most cases.
Scholars and practitioners who write about the disciplinary process generally
ignore how disciplinary authorities winnow out cases involving misconduct.14
This Article focuses on disciplinary counsel’s charging decisions in
cases where advocates engage in litigation-related misconduct that is
directed at the court, the opposing party, or other third parties, with the object
of advancing the client’s objectives. Situations where advocates
overzealously pursue the client’s interests may be distinguished from those
where lawyers engage in self-interested misconduct at the client’s expense,
such as overbilling, failing to competently carry out the client’s objectives
or to conduct work diligently, failing to reasonably communicate with the
client, or breaching the client’s confidences.15 In other words, this Article
3.1 is “seldom enforced by disciplinary authorities”); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule
11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation of
Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 808–10 (2004) (concluding that disciplinary agencies rarely sanction
litigators for frivolous filings); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal
Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN. L. REV. 37, 38 (1993) (anticipating that the adoption of Civil Rule 11 would lead
to increased disciplinary referrals for frivolous filings).
13
See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. In Rudy Giuliani’s case, an organization representing
journalists asked the state appellate court to make the records of disciplinary proceedings public. Letter from
Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press to Att’y Grievance Comm., Sup. Ct. of the State of N.Y.,
App. Div., First Jud. Dep’t (Apr. 16, 2021) (available at https://media.sipiapa.org/adjuntos/185/documentos
/001/839/0001839350.pdfhttps://media.sipiapa.org/adjuntos/185/documentos/001/839/0001839350.pdf).
14
See, e.g., Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of
Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PRO. 209 (2011) (describing state disciplinary processes, which
include decisions by bar counsel regarding when to file formal complaints, but not describing the
substantive grounds on which these decisions are made).
15
This distinction tracks the one made by David Wilkins between externality and agency
transgressions. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 819–20
(1992). For a discussion of how disciplinary processes address lawyers’ professional misconduct directed
at clients, see Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 685–
91 (2003) [hereinafter Zacharias, Purposes].
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focuses on how disciplinary authorities respond when advocates violate their
duties as “officers of the court.”16
Advocacy misconduct is highly regulated by disciplinary rules. Many
contemporary disciplinary rules may be traced to writings from the
nineteenth century when, unlike today, most lawyers were trial lawyers.17
Consequently, the rules are directed significantly, and perhaps
disproportionately, toward the regulation of trial advocacy.18 Many of these
rules restrain lawyers’ advocacy on litigants’ behalf in order to promote the
integrity of judicial proceedings, fairness to opposing parties and third
parties, judicial efficiency, and other public and judicial values. In the course
of litigation, it is not uncommon for lawyers to complain about their
opposing counsel’s overzealous conduct.
Advocates’ courtroom work is highly visible. There is a cultural
assumption that advocates are more likely than other lawyers to skirt the edge
of the law, if not go over the edge, and parties and lawyers have an incentive
to object when the opposing lawyer appears to have acted improperly.
Therefore, one might expect disciplinary agencies to receive many complaints
about advocates’ conduct, at least if lawyers and others expect such agencies
to take complaints seriously. One might also expect disciplinary agencies to
take lawyers’ visible misconduct seriously, particularly when it occurs in
high-profile litigation, because of the potential impact on the public’s
perception of the legal profession. This raises the possibility of overenforcement since, besides being subject to the formal disciplinary processes
in the states where they are admitted to practice law, advocates are also subject
to sanction by the trial courts in which they appear in any given case.19 But, as
16

For discussions of lawyers’ role and responsibilities as “officers of the court,” see James A.
Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
349, 380–87 (2000); Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, What Is a Lawyer? A Reconstruction of the Lawyer
as an Officer of the Court, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 425, 448–51 (2012).
17
Today, fewer lawyers are litigators, and many civil litigators devote much of their time to work
outside judicial proceedings, such as arbitrations, administrative proceedings, investigations, and prelitigation work leading to settlements. Even those who participate in civil litigation rarely conduct trials.
Although judges are busy, many preside over trials infrequently. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The
Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012) (providing statistics
showing that “trials have become ‘vanishingly rare’”); Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and
Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004) (discussing possible reasons why the rate of federal trials has declined).
18
See Bruce A. Green, Judicial Regulation of US Civil Litigators, 16 LEGAL ETHICS 306, 309–11
(2013) (explaining “[t]he dominance of lawyers’ civil advocacy role in the professional conduct rules”).
19
Litigators are not the only lawyers who may be disciplined outside states’ formal disciplinary
processes. For example, some lawyers, such as patent lawyers and securities lawyers, may be disciplined
by the administrative agencies before which they appear. See generally Michael P. Cox, Regulation of
Attorneys Practicing Before Federal Agencies, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 195–97 (1984) (examining
federal agencies’ ability to regulate attorney conduct and the federal government’s authority to impose
restrictions on attorneys in the administrative realm); Jon J. Lee, Double Standards: An Empirical Study
of Patent and Trademark Discipline, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1633–36 (2020) (describing the disciplinary
process for lawyers appearing before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
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it turns out, the greater problem is under-enforcement, as trial courts defer to
disciplinary agencies and vice versa.
To offer some insight into the significance and implications of
disciplinary counsel’s exercise of charging discretion in cases of overzealous
advocacy, this Article focuses on the disciplinary process in the state of New
York where a significant percentage of United States lawyers are licensed to
practice.20 The New York disciplinary process has previously been selected
for study by others, most notably Richard Abel and Stephen Gillers.21
Although its disciplinary process is not wholly representative, New York is a
useful state in which to study the disciplinary regulation of advocates. This is
both because the state has many lawyers and many judicial proceedings and
because its advocates have sometimes been associated with an aggressive, socalled “hardball” or “Rambo” style of litigation.22 Some New York lawyers’
presumed propensity to test the limits of proper or civil advocacy may lead to
transgressive professional conduct. Overzealousness is particularly likely to
occur in settings where lawyers do not interact with each other regularly. New
York’s urban litigators often lack the regular professional interactions that
might temper otherwise overly aggressive tendencies.
This Article begins in Part I with a brief discussion of the historical
development of disciplinary law and processes, then turns in Part II to a
description of the New York disciplinary process. Two defining features of
the disciplinary process, like the criminal process, are prosecutorial discretion
and a lack of transparency. Although there are many substantive disciplinary
rules regulating advocates, and violations may occur with regularity,
professional disciplinary proceedings are selectively initiated for reasons that
are not publicly acknowledged. As Part III shows, this results in a substantial
disparity between the perceived incidence of disciplinary misconduct by
advocates and the actual imposition of discipline for overzealous advocacy.
Employing the allegedly frivolous election challenges as a case study, Part IV
explores four important, but under-examined, concerns raised by selective
disciplinary enforcement of the rules regulating advocate conduct.

20
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: LAWYER POPULATION BY
STATE (2021), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/2021-national
-lawyer-population-survey.pdf (reporting that, in 2021, New York had 185,076 active resident lawyers,
out of 1,327,910 nationwide); RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING ETHICAL
MISCONDUCT vii (2011) [hereinafter ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL].
21
Id.; Stephen Gillers, Lowering the Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in New York Fails to Protect the
Public, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 487 (2014).
22
See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 840 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming the contempt
conviction of a criminal defense lawyer who repeatedly violated court orders against prejudicial pretrial
media interviews); Kunstler v. Galligan, 168 A.D.2d 146, 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (upholding the
contempt conviction against a lawyer who disobeyed a court order by “contemptuously and insolently
argu[ing] a motion” after the court called the next case).
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I. A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HOW DISCIPLINARY LAW AND
PROCESSES DEVELOPED
In the United States, state courts regulate lawyers’ professional conduct
by overseeing the disciplinary process,23 which is regarded as a
distinguishing feature of our self-regulating profession.24 Its purpose is to
protect the public by identifying and sanctioning—including, when
necessary, suspending or disbarring—lawyers who violate the applicable
rules of professional conduct, which are often referred to as disciplinary
rules or ethics rules.25 Although lawyers are directly and indirectly regulated
in other ways, the disciplinary process is considered to be the principal
mechanism for regulating lawyers.26
Section A briefly addresses the nineteenth century origins of state
disciplinary processes. Section B describes how state judiciaries came to
draw heavily from the work product of the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) in adopting the substantive standards of conduct upon which
disciplinary decisions are based. Section C briefly notes the development of
formal disciplinary processes beginning in the late nineteenth century, as
well as the shift from courts’ reliance on bar associations to courts’ retention
of professional disciplinary counsel or bar counsel.27
A. Nineteenth Century Origins of the Disciplinary Process
State courts used their disciplinary authority only sporadically through the
late nineteenth century. In general, lawyers took short oaths at the time of their
admission to practice, and some of the norms of conduct upon which
23
For a discussion of the alternative possibility of federal regulation, see Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 396–406 (1994). For a broader exploration of which
institutions are best situated to regulate lawyers, see generally Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional
Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures or the
Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167 (2003).
24
For an early discussion of the role of professional discipline in justifying professional selfregulation, see JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 20–23 (1916). Courts also
regulate lawyers through the admissions process, by overseeing lawyers who appear before them, and by
interpreting common law and other law that regulates lawyers’ conduct. See generally Fred C. Zacharias
& Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 73 (2009) (arguing
that courts should “harmonize” laws that regulate lawyers in different contexts). For a discussion
questioning whether courts should have such extensive regulatory oversight of the bar, see generally Eli
Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149 (2010).
25
For discussions of the purposes of lawyer discipline, see generally Zacharias, Purposes, supra
note 15; Gillers, supra note 21, at 490–95.
26
For a discussion of the multiplicity of lawyer regulatory mechanisms and the resulting
complexities, see generally Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996).
27
For more extensive histories of disciplinary processes and descriptions of contemporary
processes, see generally Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the
United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911 (1994); Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer
Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10–21 (2007) [hereinafter Levin, Secrecy].
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discipline was predicated were understood to be implicit in, or derived from,
these oaths or from the general requirement of good moral character.28 State
courts occasionally suspended or disbarred lawyers for substantial
misconduct, sustained misconduct, and particularly criminal wrongdoing.29
State courts typically commenced the disciplinary process by ordering the
lawyer to “show cause” as to why he should not be disbarred.30 This was
followed by a hearing into the alleged misconduct. Courts rarely initiated such
proceedings, except when lawyers committed serious wrongdoing, perhaps
because of the burden they imposed on judges, judges’ high tolerance for
overzealousness, or their sympathy for fellow members of the bar.31
To some extent, the nineteenth century disciplinary process was
supplemented by other processes that directly or indirectly served a
regulatory function. If a lawyer wronged a client, then the client might, in
theory, sue the lawyer for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, or breach
of contract. But these remedies were rarely pursued, partially due to the
difficulty of finding a lawyer to take the case.32 In judicial proceedings, if a
lawyer acted improperly in relation to the judge, opposing party, or witness,
the court could also impose a sanction ranging from rebuke to punishment
for contempt of court.33

28
See generally Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s Oath: Both Ancient and Modern, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2009) (discussing the historical background and evolution of lawyers’ oaths in the
United States). See also Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140, 145–46, 153–55 (1875) (ordering that the
lawyer be disbarred for engaging in forgery, which was held to be inconsistent with the “good moral
character” required for ongoing admission to the bar, as well as with the lawyer’s oath at the time of
admission, namely, that “you will conduct yourself in the office of an attorney within the courts according
to the best of your knowledge and discretion, and with all good fidelity, as well to the courts as your
clients”).
29
See Devlin, supra note 27, at 917 (discussing how judges initiated disciplinary cases on an ad
hoc basis, but only rarely and in extreme cases).
30
See Levin, supra note 27, at 11–12 (noting that, until the twentieth century, courts typically
initiated disciplinary proceedings against lawyers by issuing an order to show cause); see, e.g., Sanborn,
64 Me. at 141 (indicating that the lawyer must “show cause” as to why he should not be disbarred).
31
Cf. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883) (“Undoubtedly, the power is one that ought always
to be exercised with great caution; and ought never to be exercised except in clear cases of misconduct,
which affect the standing and character of the party as an attorney. But when such a case is shown to
exist, the courts ought not to hesitate, from sympathy for the individual, to protect themselves from
scandal and contempt, and the public from prejudice, by removing grossly improper persons from
participation in the administration of the laws.”).
32
See Susan Saab Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the Courthouse Doors for
Legal Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2038–39 (2017) (“For decades, prospective
malpractice plaintiffs faced a ‘conspiracy of silence,’ meaning that as a matter of professional courtesy
lawyers did not criticize, sue, or testify against other lawyers.”). Lawyers continue to be reluctant to
represent plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions. See id. at 2039 ( “Although more lawyers are now willing
to pursue legal malpractice claims, prospective plaintiffs in various circles and communities may still
encounter resistance.”).
33
See, e.g., Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. 364 (1868) (reviewing a contempt sanction against a lawyer);
In re Wood, 45 N.W. 1113 (Mich. 1890) (reviewing same).
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B. The Development of Disciplinary Rules
In most states, through the end of the nineteenth century, there were no
extensive, much less comprehensive, written rules governing lawyers’
professional conduct.34 Some of the courts’ normative expectations were
incorporated in judicial opinions regarding lawyers’ obligations to their clients
established by agency law and other bodies of common law or regarding
lawyers’ obligations as advocates in the civil and criminal cases in which they
appeared. The norms of professional conduct were also embodied in
secondary writings, particularly those of David Hoffman and George
Sharswood.35 These professional expectations were transmitted informally
within lawyers’ small professional communities.36
In 1878, a handful of elite lawyers from around the country formed the
ABA, motivated by a concern about the degradation of law practice and by the
hope of elevating professional standards.37 In its early days, in addition to
promoting more demanding standards for admission to the bar and for judicial
practice, the ABA sought to promote standards of lawyer conduct.38 In 1908,
after a multi-year drafting process, the ABA adopted the Canons of Ethics
(“Canons”).39 The Canons, a set of “pronouncements,”40 did not have the force
of law because they were adopted by a volunteer, non-governmental
organization that lacked regulatory power. But the ABA’s hope was that the
34
For a discussion of the development of professional conduct codes, beginning with Alabama’s
adoption of the first state professional ethics code for lawyers in 1887, see generally Carol Rice Andrews,
Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385 (2004).
35
See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2395, 2397 n.14 (2003) (citing authority regarding the influence of Hoffman and Sharswood); Michael
Ariens, Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of American Legal Ethics, 67 ARK. L. REV. 571
(2014) (describing Hoffman’s influence); Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at
the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 9 (1999) (explaining that the drafters of the
1908 Canons looked to secondary writings, including the treatises of Hoffman and Sharswood); M.H.
Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The “Other Tradition”, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793, 794
(1999) (stating that Hoffman’s and Sharswood’s writings shaped the nineteenth century view of legal
ethics); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 241, 250 n.60 (1992) (noting that prior to Sharswood’s essay, Hoffman’s writing was the
only major guide for lawyers).
36
Altman, supra note 35, at 2415–16 (describing that, before 1908, “the informal understandings
of appropriate lawyer conduct, coupled with the peer pressure among lawyers in a smaller, more
homogenous legal community, had seemed sufficient”) (footnote omitted).
37
Simeon E. Baldwin, The Founding of the American Bar Association, 3 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 658,
658–60 (1917).
38
See Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343,
415–17 (2008) (describing early twentieth-century efforts to raise admissions and educational standards
for law licenses); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in
the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 514 (2008) (“[T]he Canons
of Judicial Ethics, published in 1924, became a way to counter growing critique that judges were merely
partisans in an increasingly hostile class war.”).
39
COMM. ON CODE OF PRO. ETHICS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: CANONS OF ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) [hereinafter ABA CANONS].
40
Green & Roiphe, supra note 38, at 514.
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Canons would both influence lawyers in regulating their own conduct and
eventually influence courts in regulating lawyers.41 Beginning in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state and local bar associations grew in
number and allied themselves with the ABA’s efforts to promote the Canons.42
In part because the Canons drew significantly from the writings of the
nineteenth century, when lawyers were primarily trial advocates, most of the
original thirty-two Canons were directed at lawyers’ advocacy role.43 They
addressed such topics as: “The Duty of the Lawyer to the Courts;”44 “The
Selection of Judges;”45 “Attempts to Exert Personal Influence on the
Court;”46 “When [Serving as] Counsel for an Indigent Prisoner;”47 “The
Defense or Prosecution of Those Accused of Crime;”48 “Acquiring Interest
in Litigation;”49 “How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client’s
Cause;”50 “Ill Feeling and Personalities Between Advocates;”51 “Treatment
of Witnesses and Litigants;”52 “Appearance of Lawyer as Witness for His
Client;”53 “Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation;”54 “Punctuality
and Expedition;”55 “Attitude Toward Jury;”56 “Right of Lawyer to Control
the Incidents of the Trial;”57 “Stirring up Litigation, Directly or Through
Agents;”58 “Justifiable and Unjustifiable Litigations;”59 and “Responsibility

41

Altman, supra note 35, at 2399–402.
Among the early leaders were the New York City Bar, founded in 1870 as the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, and the New York County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA), founded in
1908 in response to the New York City Bar’s exclusionary policies. See generally EDWIN DAVID
ROBERTSON, BRETHREN AND SISTERS OF THE BAR: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK
COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION (2008) (detailing the history of the New York County Lawyers
Association). Shortly after the ABA adopted the Canons, NYCLA established the first bar association
“ethics committee” to publish opinions guiding lawyers on the scope of their professional obligations,
and other bar associations followed suit. See Leah F. Chanin, The Scope and Use of State Ethics Opinions,
14 J. LEGAL PRO. 161, 162 (1989) (observing that the NYCLA was “the first committee on professional
ethics in the United States”).
43
See Andrews, supra note 28, at 6 (“The model [oath’s] . . . ‘just’ causes clause was at the center
of the ABA’s primary drafting debate—the proper advocacy roles of lawyers.”).
44
ABA CANONS, supra note 39, at Canon 1.
45
Id. at Canon 2.
46
Id. at Canon 3.
47
Id. at Canon 4.
48
Id. at Canon 5.
49
Id. at Canon 10.
50
Id. at Canon 15.
51
Id. at Canon 17.
52
Id. at Canon 18.
53
Id. at Canon 19.
54
Id. at Canon 20.
55
Id. at Canon 21.
56
Id. at Canon 23.
57
Id. at Canon 24.
58
Id. at Canon 28.
59
Id. at Canon 30.
42
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for Litigation.” Even the provisions that were not directed exclusively
toward advocates—such as those on conflicts of interest, advice,
negotiations, handling client property, and legal fees—were applicable to
advocates, and they generally captured norms that were first developed in
situations in which lawyers had served as advocates.61
By the 1960s, the ABA recognized that the Canons were too vague to
be fairly enforced and that they did not adequately address all the functions
beyond advocacy that lawyers performed, especially in transactional
settings.62 In 1970, after a sustained and inclusive drafting process, the ABA
effectively replaced the Canons with an entirely new set of provisions, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”).63 At the ABA’s
urging, almost all state courts adopted the Model Code (with various
revisions of their own) and used its rules as the basis for imposing discipline,
such as disbarment and suspension, when lawyers engaged in misconduct.64
Around a decade later, seeing further need for improvement, the ABA
launched another comprehensive drafting process, which resulted in its
adoption of a different set of rules, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(“Model Rules”), in 1983.65 The provisions of the Model Rules were largely
derived from those of the Model Code, but, again, the ABA sought to better
address the roles that contemporary lawyers serve outside the courtroom.66
60

Id. at Canon 31.
Over the next decades, the ABA amended and expanded the Canons to address previously
overlooked subjects, some important and others trivial. Important overlooked subjects included Canon
37, “Confidences of a Client,” whereas trivial overlooked subjects included Canon 33’s discussion of
permissible law firm names. 51 ANN. REP. AM. BAR ASS’N 767, 778–79 (1928).
62
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54–55 (1986) (observing that the Canons
“[spoke] of a kind of law practice that was carried on almost entirely in the courtroom” and that “their
wording [was] too vague and general to afford guidance”).
63
MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969). The Model Code’s disciplinary rules were
less vague than the earlier Canons (although they still left many questions of interpretation and
judgment), and they more meaningfully addressed lawyers’ non-advocacy roles. For a history of the
ABA’s drafting of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, see generally John F. Sutton, Jr., The
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255,
255–56 (1970).
64
See Gregory C. Sisk, Susan Saab Fortney, Charles G. Geyh, Neil W. Hamilton, William D.
Henderson, Vincent R. Johnson, Stephen L. Pepper & Melissa H. Weresh, LEGAL ETHICS,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 113 (2018) (“With the exception of
California, every state adopted the Model Code, at least in modified form.”).
65
MODEL RULES, supra note 3.
66
Cf. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Code, 6 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 241, 246 n.34 (1992) (noting that the ABA’s shift from the Canons to the Model Code
included “the lawyer’s role as negotiator and counselor” and that the shift from the Model Code to the
Model Rules “represent[ed] a similar change in emphasis, especially with regard to enforcement”).
Among the new rules relating to transactional lawyers was Rule 2.3, addressing lawyers’ preparation of
evaluations for third parties. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, r. 2.3. For a discussion of Rule 2.3, see Edward
A. Carr, Attorney Opinion Letters: Model Rule 2.3 and the Texas Experience, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1127
(1996). Another was Rule 2.2, which addressed lawyers’ role as intermediaries between clients, but
which was later repealed. For a discussion of Rule 2.2, see John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as
61

164

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1

The ABA has amended the Model Rules periodically since then, including
a comprehensive amendment in 2002, and the Model Rules are now the basis
(with variation) for almost all state courts’ disciplinary rules.67 As might be
expected, the Model Rules devote significant attention to lawyers’
non-advocacy roles.68 But they include many provisions specifically related
to lawyers’ conduct as advocates,69 and many of the generally applicable
provisions have significance for lawyers serving as advocates, as well as in
other roles.
C. The Development of Formal Disciplinary Processes
From the start, bar associations regarded improving the disciplinary
processes as important to their project of raising professional standards.70
They understood that the objective of discipline was to rid the profession of
bad actors, both to protect the public and to promote public confidence in
the legal profession.71 Bar associations offered to assume substantial
responsibility for professional discipline, in part to advance the profession’s
claim of being self-regulating.72 In the 1890s, the New York state courts
began delegating responsibility to the New York City Bar and other local
bar associations to initiate disciplinary investigations; bring disciplinary
charges; conduct disciplinary hearings; and make recommendations to the
courts concerning whether a lawyer engaged in misconduct and the
appropriate sanction, thereby relieving the courts of much of the burden of
disciplinary proceedings.73
Particularly over the past fifty years, state disciplinary processes have
evolved, and the ABA has played a significant role in encouraging reform by

Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 741.
67
See generally Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002) (reviewing the amendments
made to the Model Rules in 2002).
68
See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 3, r. 1.13 (addressing responsibilities in representing an
organization); id. r. 2.1 (addressing responsibilities as an advisor); id. r. 2.3 (addressing responsibilities
in preparing an evaluation for the benefit of a third party).
69
Id. rr. 3.1–3.9.
70
See Devlin, supra note 27, at 917–19 (describing early developments in bar associations and
lawyer discipline).
71
See id. at 918–19 (“[C]oncerns about the lack of professional control began to be addressed in an
organized manner with the formation of local bar associations. . . . [which] had been concerned with
professional misconduct . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
72
See id. at 919 (noting that early bar associations were “organized for the purpose of good
fellowship” and, over time, these bar associations began investigating grievances).
73
See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Defense Lawyering at the Edge: A Look Back, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 353, 373–74 (2007) (describing an early twentieth century disciplinary case before the New York
City Bar). See generally COHEN, supra note 24, at 1–23 (describing the role of the Grievance Committee
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in the early 1900s).

2022]

SELECTIVELY DISCIPLINING ADVOCATES

165
74

adopting and promoting recommendations for disciplinary enforcement. In
many states, the disciplinary process is now overseen by full-time staff
lawyers who serve in a prosecutorial role and have the responsibility to
investigate allegations of lawyer misconduct, initiate disciplinary
proceedings, and serve as prosecution counsel in disciplinary hearings.
II.

THE CONTEMPORARY DISCIPLINARY LAW AND PROCESS: NEW
YORK AS AN ILLUSTRATION

State disciplinary processes vary in many ways, and studies often focus
on a single jurisdiction.75 Rather than seeking to describe the variation, this
Part focuses on New York’s disciplinary law and process as an illustration.
The defining features of New York’s disciplinary process, which itself entails
regional variation, are discretion and lack of transparency; professional
disciplinary authorities pursue only a fraction of the complaints against
lawyers, and they do not publicly justify their discretionary decisions.76
In New York, attorney disciplinary proceedings generally enforce the
New York Rules of Professional Conduct (“NY Rules”),77 which are heavily
74
For examples of ABA proposals regarding the disciplinary process, see MODEL RULES FOR LAW.
DISCIPLINARY ENF’T (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989, amended 2002); STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAW.
SANCTIONS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1986, amended 1992); STANDARDS FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY
PROC. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1979); AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENF’T, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970). For critiques of
the ABA’s model disciplinary procedures, see generally James Duke Cameron, Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions—A Long Overdue Document, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91 (1987); Leslie C. Levin, The
Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). Disciplinary counsel from some states began informal meetings in the late
1950s that led, in 1965, to the formation of a non-profit group, the National Organization of Bar Counsel,
which promotes exchanges between lawyer disciplinary counsel that further influence state disciplinary
reform. About NOBC, NAT’L ORG. OF BAR COUNS., https://www.nobc.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
75
See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008) (providing a study based on New York disciplinary proceedings);
ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL, supra note 20 (providing a study based on California disciplinary
proceedings); Gillers, supra note 21 (recommending reform of the New York disciplinary process); Jack
A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process—1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique,
and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947 (1994) (recommending reform of the Ohio
disciplinary process).
76
See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too
Little Enforcement?, 8 ST . THOMAS L. REV . 69, 89 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Policing Federal
Prosecutors] (“[T]he dearth of reported disciplinary proceedings brought by state authorities against
federal prosecutors reflects that . . . [they are] rarely initiated.”); Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline:
Conscientious Noncompliance, Conscious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1307, 1309–12 (1998) (discussing whether disciplinary authorities should seek to sanction a
lawyer who gave financial support to a client based on humanitarian impulses); Bruce A. Green &
Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial
Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 144 (2016)
(discussing “[d]isciplinary authorities’ deferential treatment of prosecutors”).
77
N.Y. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2009, amended 2020) [hereinafter N.Y.
RULES]. The state and local bar associations, led by the New York State Bar Association, have played a
substantial role in proposing professional conduct rules and amendments to those rules. See, e.g.,
Brandon Vogel, A Better Proposal for the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS’N (June 15, 2021), https://nysba.org/a-better-proposal-for-the-new-york-rules-of-professional-conduct/
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influenced by the ABA Model Rules. Although New York state and local
bar associations sometimes issue reports promoting procedural reform of the
disciplinary process in the state, they no longer play a formal role in the
process. The intermediate appellate courts, which have principal
responsibility for admitting and disciplining lawyers, have established
grievance committees covering different regions of the state.79 The process
is staffed and administered by full-time lawyers who serve in prosecutorial
roles, but it also benefits from the assistance of volunteer lawyers who
oversee or assist in aspects of the staff’s work.80 The processes employed in
different parts of the state varied significantly until 2016 when the state
courts adopted procedures intended to make the processes more consistent,
though not centralized or entirely uniform.81
The disciplinary process gives substantial discretion to the disciplinary
agency to decide how to dispose of misconduct allegations. In brief outline:
the disciplinary committee’s staff reviews allegations of lawyer misconduct
that come from current and former clients, judges, other lawyers, or other
(discussing a state bar committee’s proposal to amend New York’s rules). The state judiciary is heavily
influenced by the state bar’s work product, although it also relies on court administrators and often rejects
the state bar associations’ proposals.
78
The wording of the New York Rules borrows substantially from the ABA Model Rules, but the
state judiciary, often at the urging of the state bar association or of judicial administrators, has diverged
from the ABA model in many small ways; has retained some provisions of the earlier ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility that the ABA Model Rules did not; and has included some provisions that
are uniquely worded. Among the notable differences is that the New York Rules subject law firms, as
well as individual lawyers, to discipline. Ted Schneyer, who was initially the proponent of law firm
discipline, later reconsidered its utility. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional SelfRegulation” Should Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ.
L. REV. 577, 616–19 (2011).
79
NYS COMM’N ON STATEWIDE ATT’Y DISCIPLINE, ENHANCING FAIRNESS AND CONSISTENCY:
FOSTERING EFFICIENCY AND TRANSPARENCY 6–8 (2015), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/ATTORNEYS/
DISCIPLINE/Documents/AttyDiscFINAL9-24.pdf.
80
For descriptions of staffing in the four New York departments’ grievance committees, see ATT’Y
GRIEVANCE COMM., SUP. CT., APP. DIV., FIRST JUD. DEP’T, HOW TO FILE A COMPLAINT 2 (2020),
https://nycourts.gov/courts/AD1/Committees&Programs/DDC/How%20to%20File%20a%20Compl
aint%2007.30.2020.pdf [hereinafter FIRST JUD. DEP’T COMPLAINT INSTRUCTIONS]; Attorney Matters:
How to Make a Complaint About a Lawyer, N.Y. CTS: APP. DIV., SECOND JUD. DEP’T,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad2/attorneymatters_ComplaintAboutaLawyer.shtml (last visited Oct.
30, 2021) [hereinafter Second Jud. Dep’t Complaint Instructions]; ATT’Y GRIEVANCE COMM., SUP. CT.,
APP. DIV., THIRD JUD. DEP’T, OVERVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 2 (2019),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ad3/agc/Forms/OverviewAttyDiscipProcess.pdf [hereinafter THIRD JUD. DEP’T
COMPLAINT INSTRUCTIONS]; ATT’Y GRIEVANCE COMMS., SUP. CT., APP. DIV., FOURTH JUD.
DEP’T, HOW COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTORNEYS ARE PROCESSED, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/
AG/AG-brochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2021) [hereinafter FOURTH JUD. DEP’T COMPLAINT
INSTRUCTIONS].
81
See generally HAL R. LIEBERMAN, J. RICHARD SUPPLE & HARVEY PRAGER, NEW YORK
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2016). The following description of the New York
disciplinary process derives from Lieberman, Supple, and Prager and from personal experience,
including that as a volunteer member of the disciplinary committee in Manhattan for a period prior to the
2016 reforms. For a critical discussion of the New York process before it was reformed, see Gillers,
supra note 21, at 496–515.
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sources, occasionally including the staff’s own review of judicial opinions
or news articles.82 If the allegations are baseless on their face because the
alleged conduct would not be a disciplinary violation, or if the allegations
seem trivial or otherwise unworthy of attention, the staff may close the file,
with notice to any complainant, or refer the complainant to another
process.83 For example, clients with complaints about fees are typically
advised about the process for fee arbitration.84 With few exceptions, parties
with complaints that relate to pending litigation are advised that the
grievance committee will not consider the complaint at that time, but that
the complainant may resubmit the allegations after the litigation has ended.85
This practice avoids interfering with court proceedings that may address the
same issue; encourages parties to raise their complaints with the courts in
the first instance; and conserves disciplinary resources in cases where the
court makes a finding or reaches a resolution to which the grievance
committee may defer.
If some inquiry appears to be warranted, the staff asks the accused
lawyer to respond to the complaint or allegation that prompted the staff’s
inquiry, and the staff then provides the response to the complainant and
invites rebuttal.86 In many or most cases, the staff is satisfied with the
lawyer’s response and, with approval from supervisors or others exercising
oversight, closes the file with notice to any complainant.87 However, if the
staff is dissatisfied, it may undertake its own investigation, which may
include obtaining records and questioning the lawyer, the complainant, and
others. In many cases, the staff simply closes the file at the end of the
investigation. Sometimes, before closing the file, the staff writes a
cautionary letter to the lawyer. But, other times, it files a formal complaint
that goes on to be adjudicated before a referee.88
Throughout the process, lawyers who concede that they engaged in
questionable or improper conduct may attempt to negotiate a resolution of
the case, which may range from a private warning or admonition (private
82

FIRST JUD. DEP’T COMPLAINT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 80, at 3–6; Second Jud. Dep’t Complaint
Instructions, supra note 80; THIRD JUD. DEP’T COMPLAINT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 80, at 2–7; FOURTH
JUD. DEP’T COMPLAINT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 80; Attorney Conduct and Discipline, SUP. CT. STATE
N.Y., APP. DIV., FOURTH JUD. DEP’T, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Clerk/AttyMttrs/atty-discip.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 30, 2021) [hereinafter Fourth Jud. Dep’t Complaint Platform].
83
See LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 81.
84
Id.
85
This practice is not unique to New York. See, e.g., OFF. OF LAWS. PRO. RESP., COMPLAINTS AND
INVESTIGATIONS 6, http://lprb.mncourts.gov/complaints/LawyerComplaintDocs/Complaint%20Brochure
%20-%20English.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2021) (“Examples of complaints that are often dismissed
without investigation include . . . most matters pending in court, unless the misconduct is clear and
serious . . . .”).
86
See LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 81.
87
Id.
88
Id.
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reprimand) to a public sanction—typically, a public reprimand, suspension,
or disbarment. Those who contest the allegations in the staff’s formal
complaint may opt for a hearing before a referee who makes factual findings
and recommendations, which may be accepted by both sides or brought
before the intermediate appellate court for its own determination.89 As
Section B discusses, the number of cases that result in a public sanction,
whether by agreement or court finding, is small in proportion to the number
of misconduct allegations considered by the disciplinary staff.
New York’s disciplinary process is less transparent than that of many
other states.90 The grievance committees do not make complaints from
clients, judges, and others available to the public, although complainants and
lawyers receiving complaints may do so. The committees do not give public
explanations for their decisions to dismiss complaints, although
complainants and lawyers receiving complaints may publicize their
correspondence with the disciplinary counsel.91 When complaints are
rejected, complainants receive only cursory explanations.92
In New York, with rare exception, when complaints are not summarily
dismissed, disciplinary investigations are pursued in secret; formal charges
are filed in secret; and disciplinary hearings are held in secret.93 Some cases
of misconduct are resolved privately, for example, by a private warning or
private reprimand. Unless a court imposes public discipline—typically, a
public reprimand, suspension, or disbarment—there is no public record of
that which occurred in the disciplinary process, save year-end reports that
are unrevealing because any information they offer on specific non-public
cases is mostly in generalized and highly anonymized form.94
89

Id. at 116.
Levin, Secrecy, supra note 27, at 14–15, 14 n.80, 20 nn.124 & 126, 32 n.191, 35 n.208, 38.
91
In a recent case, a lawyer for New York City asserted that law professors who filed a series of
disciplinary complaints against state prosecutors violated the law by publicizing their complaints, to
which the professors responded by filing a civil rights lawsuit asserting that the threat of sanctions
violated their free speech rights. See Jonah E. Bromwich, They Publicized Prosecutors’ Misconduct. The
Blowback Was Swift., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/nyregion/
queens-prosecutors-misconduct.html (reporting on grievances filed against twenty-one Queens, New
York prosecutors and the subsequent response by the prosecutors’ attorney).
92
At the other extreme, Ohio’s disciplinary process makes complaints and filings in pending
proceedings publicly available online. Online Docket, OHIO BD. OF PRO . CONDUCT ,
http://supremecourt.ohio.gov/bpccm (last visited July 31, 2021).
93
See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(10) (McKinney 2021) (“Any statute or rule to the contrary
notwithstanding, all papers, records and documents upon the application or examination of any person
for admission as an attorney and counsellor at law and upon any complaint, inquiry, investigation or
proceeding relating to the conduct or discipline of an attorney or attorneys, shall be sealed and be deemed
private and confidential.”). New York state courts have authority to disclose disciplinary records upon a
showing of “good cause” under this law but have exercised this authority only in rare and extreme cases,
such as when Roy Cohn was found to have waived confidentiality by publicly accusing disciplinary
authorities of corruption. In re New York News (Cohn), 113 A.D.2d 92, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
94
The federal courts in New York have their own admissions and disciplinary processes. See Judith
A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, Disciplinary Enforcement, in 30 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
90
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The committees’ annual reports do provide some aggregate statistical
information, however. For example, the Grievance Committee for the Fourth
Judicial Department has jurisdiction over approximately 14,000 lawyers
who practice in twenty-two of the state’s western counties, including the
three major cities of Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse.95 The Grievance
Committee’s 2019 annual report says that it disposed of complaints
involving 1,529 lawyers, some of whom were the subject of two or more
complaints.96 Of these, the complaints against 791 lawyers were rejected out
of hand for failing to state a complaint, and 405 other complaints were
dismissed or withdrawn, presumably after the lawyer submitted a
satisfactory response or an investigation was concluded.97 The Committee
issued ninety-eight lawyers a “Letter of Advisement,”98 which is not
regarded as a disciplinary sanction and does not necessarily imply a finding
of misconduct. Nineteen lawyers received a letter of admonition, which
qualifies as a private sanction.99 The report does not disclose the conduct
underlying any of the matters resulting in non-public letters of advisement
or admonition. One hundred and sixteen lawyers were referred to the
Appellate Division.100
In 2019, sixty-three cases referred by the Grievance Committee for the
Fourth Judicial Department were processed in the court. 101 (Many or most
cases had probably been referred in prior years.) Of these, only forty-five
clearly involved disciplinary complaints. 102 (Eighteen involved
non-disciplinary resignations or applications for reinstatement. 103) Of the
forty-five disciplinary cases, twenty resulted in public discipline, including
806-1 (3d ed. 2013). Typically, the federal courts simply piggyback on the state disciplinary agencies’
work by suspending or disbarring lawyers after they have been similarly sanctioned by the state. Jerome
Davis, Disbarment in the Federal Courts, 85 YALE L.J. 975, 975–76 (1976). The federal courts also have
ad hoc disciplinary processes for investigating and adjudicating misconduct by lawyers in federal judicial
proceedings. Id. at 977. Federal courts are more reliant than the state processes on volunteer lawyers. It
is unclear how often the federal courts invoke their own processes rather than simply referring
misconduct to the disciplinary authorities of the states in which the lawyers in question are licensed. See
William J. Hamilton, Treating All Attorneys Fairly: Changing the Rules for Disbarment, Regardless of
Conduct, 32 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 659, 664 (2019) (“Significantly less literature is available on federal
disbarments, as most journal articles seem to focus on state processes.”).
95
Attorney Grievance Committees, N.Y. CTS: APP. DIV., FOURTH JUD. DEP’T, https://www.nycou
rts.gov/courts/ad4/AG (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
96
Annual Report, N.Y. CTS: APP. DIV ., FOURTH JUD . DEP’T, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
ad4/AG/AG-ann-rep.shtm (last visited July 31, 2021) (providing the Annual Report of Fourth
Department Disciplinary Activities covering the period of January 1, 2019 through December 31,
2019).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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six disbarments, two disciplinary resignations, twelve suspensions, and no
public or private censures. 104 Thirteen cases were discontinued, dismissed,
or remanded to the Grievance Committee. 105 The remaining cases fell
within the unrevealing category of “[a]ll other [d]ispositions.”106 The
reports of the other New York disciplinary agencies reflect a similar
selectivity. 107 As the statistics reflect, disciplinary authorities engage in a
winnowing process in which substantial discretion is exercised by them
and, to a lesser degree, the courts, resulting in less than two percent of the
complaints rising to the level of public discipline.
III. ENFORCING ADVOCACY RULES
This Part shows that lawyers are disciplined for only a small percentage
of overzealous advocacy. It begins in Section A by briefly describing judges’
authority to sanction advocates’ overzealousness when it occurs in cases
over which the judges preside. There is good reason to conclude that,
although allegations of advocacy misconduct are frequent, trial judges
inquire into only a fraction of cases where misconduct is alleged. Section B

104

Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
The largest percentage of New York State lawyers are in the First Department, which includes
Manhattan and Bronx Counties. According to the First Department Disciplinary Committee’s Annual
Reports, in 2013, the Committee issued seventy-one Letters of Admonition, while eighty-six lawyers
were publicly disciplined through twenty-nine disbarments, seven resignations by lawyers facing
disciplinary charges (which is considered equivalent to disbarment), thirty-four suspensions, and sixteen
public censures. DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE APP. DIV. OF THE SUP. CT. OF THE STATE
OF N.Y., FIRST JUD. DEP’T , 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 30, 33 (2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
AD1/Committees&Programs/DDC/2013%20Annual%20Report.pdf. In 2014, the Committee issued
seventy-five Letters of Admonition, while seventy lawyers were publicly disciplined through twenty-two
disbarments, eleven resignations by lawyers facing charges, twenty-eight suspensions, and nine public
censures. DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE APP. DIV. OF THE SUP. CT. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y., FIRST JUD. DEP’T, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 34, 37 (2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/AD1/
Committees&Programs/DDC/AnnualReport2014FINAL.pdf. In 2015, the Committee issued ninety-nine
Letters of Admonition, while fifty-nine lawyers were publicly disciplined through twenty disbarments,
ten resignations by lawyers facing charges, twenty-four suspensions, and five public censures.
DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE APP. DIV. OF THE SUP. CT. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., FIRST
JUD. DEP’T, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 36, 39 (2016), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/AD1/Committees
&Programs/DDC/Annual%20Report%202015%20FINAL.pdf. The First Department’s annual reports
did not provide information about the cases in which private discipline was imposed. However, according
to the Third Department Committee on Professional Standards’ 2014 Annual Report, sixty-six lawyers
received various forms of private sanctions including seven oral admonitions, ten Letters of Admonition,
twenty-four Letters of Education, and twenty-five Letters of Caution; thirty-one lawyers were publicly
sanctioned through twelve disbarments, sixteen suspensions (aside from suspensions for noncompliance
with registration requirements), and two public censures. STATE OF N.Y., SUP. CT., APP. DIV., THIRD
JUD. DEP’T, COMM. ON PRO. STANDARDS, ANNUAL REPORT CONCERNING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 2014
2–5, 8–12 (2015) [hereinafter THIRD JUD. DEP’T 2014 ANNUAL REPORT], https://www.nycourts.gov/ad3
/AGC/Forms/annualreport2014.pdf.
105
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then describes data showing that professional discipline is rarely imposed on
New York lawyers for overzealous advocacy.
A. Advocacy Misconduct and Judicial Sanctions
Contemporary decisions recognize that state and federal courts have
inherent or “supervisory” authority to regulate the lawyers who practice
before them, which means that a judge may punish a lawyer for misconduct
in the course of a case over which the judge presides.108 At minimum,
lawyers appearing in state court must abide by the state’s professional
conduct rules.109
Like the ABA Model Rules, the NY Rules include many provisions that
apply, in whole or in part, to advocates. Among the disciplinary provisions
governing trial advocacy are those forbidding lawyers from making
non-meritorious claims and contentions,110 delaying litigation for no
substantial purpose,111 and knowingly making or failing to correct false
statements to the court.112 Some rules are derived from criminal law
governing perjury and the obstruction of justice, such as rules forbidding a
lawyer from exploiting or knowingly contributing to a witness’s false
testimony113 or helping to hide witnesses.114 Other rules are generally
derived from other law or court opinions, including a rule setting out
improprieties in courtroom examinations and in arguments to the jury115 and
a rule restricting ex parte communications with the court.116 Various other
rules, although not specifically addressing advocates, have particular
relevance to advocates in dealing with opposing counsel and witnesses,
including a rule forbidding knowingly making false statements to others,117
a rule restricting direct communication with represented persons,118 and a
rule regulating lawyers’ communication with unrepresented persons.119
108

See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003) (analyzing potential sources
of federal courts’ inherent authority to regulate lawyers). In federal cases, the leading decision is
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
109
The courts in most federal districts have adopted the professional conduct rules of the states in
which they sit, although some have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or rules of their
own derived from the Model Rules. C. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/c-aba-model-rules-professional-conduct (last visited
Sept. 29, 2021).
110
N.Y. RULES, supra note 77, r. 3.1.
111
Id. r. 3.2.
112
Id. r. 3.3(a)(1).
113
Id. rr. 3.3(a)(3), 3.4(a)(4)–(5).
114
Id. r. 3.4(a)(2).
115
Id. r. 3.4(d).
116
Id. r. 3.5(a).
117
Id. r. 4.1.
118
Id. r. 4.2.
119
Id. r. 4.3.
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Lawyers appearing in court are also governed by various rules and laws
that overlap with the professional conduct rules or are incorporated into the
professional conduct rules.120 These include civil procedure rules forbidding
the filing of frivolous claims and defenses as well as rules and laws requiring
the disclosure of various evidence and forbidding the destruction or
concealment of such evidence. Additionally, courts’ inherent authority gives
them some power to establish standards of professional conduct that are
independent of, or that expand on, rules and law. For example, court
opinions on the propriety of lawyers’ arguments to the jury often do not refer
to professional conduct rules but look back to prior opinions. Likewise, some
courts have published opinions setting forth expectations regarding
advocates’ candor to the court that are more demanding than the professional
conduct rules.121
To a significant extent, advocates may be punished in the disciplinary
process for violating the normative standards incorporated in court decisions
and procedural rules. This is because various professional conduct rules
explicitly incorporate other law. Examples include rules forbidding lawyers
from: suppressing or concealing evidence that the lawyers were legally
obligated to produce or “knowingly engag[ing] in other illegal conduct;”122
offering to pay or paying inducements to witnesses that are “prohibited by
law;”123 and disregarding a court rule or ruling.124 The result is that, with
respect to advocacy misconduct, there is a substantial overlap between the
enforceable legal standards governing litigation sanctions and those
governing professional discipline.125
Unlike state courts in disciplinary proceedings, individual judges in
adjudicative proceedings do not have the power to suspend or disbar lawyers

120
See Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425,
1444–47 (2004) (discussing conduct that federal courts sanction).
121
For an example of “duty of candor” expectations, see United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11
F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir. 1993). Courts and bar associations have also adopted civility codes, standards,
and guidelines that are not necessarily meant to be enforceable. See, e.g., Dondi Props. Corp. v. Com.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 287–88 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (adopting “standards of practice to be
observed by attorneys appearing in civil actions in this district” derived from those of the Dallas Bar
Association). For a discussion of civility codes, see generally Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as
Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994). For a discussion of
standards relating to criminal practitioners’ work, see generally Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to
Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
1111 (2011).
122
N.Y. RULES, supra note 77, rr. 3.4(a)(1), (3), (6).
123
Id. r. 3.4(b).
124
Id. r. 3.4(c).
125
See Paula Schaefer, Attorneys, Document Discovery, and Discipline, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1, 31 (2017) (“[D]iscipline does not necessarily have to occur in a satellite proceeding.”).

2022]

SELECTIVELY DISCIPLINING ADVOCATES

173

126

as a sanction for advocacy misconduct. But judges have other remedies
and sanctions at their disposal when they preside over civil or criminal cases
in which advocates engage in wrongdoing. Courts may remedy misconduct
by, for example, sustaining objections, suppressing evidence, dismissing
lawsuits, or reversing judgments.127 Sanctions directed at lawyers may
include criminal contempt of court sanctions, disqualification of counsel,
imposition of fines, and issuance of written opinions shaming lawyers.128
Judges may impose sanctions when they observe misconduct in the
court, and judges occasionally do so through actions such as summarily
sanctioning disruptive lawyers for contempt of court. However,
overzealousness occurring in a judge’s presence is often relatively
insignificant. For example, advocates are subject to sanction for various
improprieties in examining witnesses or in their arguments to the jury, but
the ordinary response to such improprieties is simply to sustain the opposing
party’s objection.129 The judge may also strike the lawyer’s statement from
the record, rebuke the lawyer, or give a curative instruction to the jury. In
the absence of an objection, the court may act on its own initiative, but
judges often do not. It would be exceedingly rare for trial judges to regard
such improprieties as occasions for professional discipline.
Judges may also sanction a lawyer in response to the opposing party’s
motion. Sanctions motions directed against the opposing lawyer are not at
all uncommon (although the more usual sanctions motion is directed against
the opposing party). However, unless the conduct in question is undisputed,
a judge may not be able to impose sanctions without first conducting a
hearing or receiving evidentiary submissions.130 Judges are not compelled to
entertain and adjudicate all allegations of lawyer misconduct that arise in a
lawsuit, and they may be reluctant to entertain sanctions motions in many
cases because of the amount of time required to adjudicate the misconduct
allegation. Particularly if judges regard the propriety of the lawyer’s conduct
126
See Bruce A. Green, Regulating Prosecutors’ Courtroom Misconduct, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 797,
806 (2019) [hereinafter Green, Prosecutors’ Misconduct] (noting that trial judges may refer lawyers to
disciplinary authorities, or initiate sanctions of contempt proceedings, when lawyers misbehave).
127
See, e.g., id. at 805 (stating that remedies for courtroom misconduct include curative instructions
and, in extreme cases, mistrials).
128
There is a substantial body of literature on judicial sanctions. See, e.g., R ICHARD E. FLAMM,
LAWYER DISQUALIFICATION: DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEYS AND LAW FIRMS 5, 6 (2d ed. 2014)
(providing information on the disqualification of lawyers); GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE
FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 11 (6th ed. 2020) (providing information on sanctions in federal
litigation); Douglas R. Richmond, Alternative Sanctions in Litigation, 47 N.M. L. REV. 209, 210 (2017)
(discussing non-monetary sanctions).
129
See Green, Prosecutors’ Misconduct, supra note 126, at 805 (Trial judges typically respond to
prosecutors’ trial misconduct “by sustaining objections and instructing jurors to disregard improper
questions and arguments”).
130
See generally Mackler Prods. Inc. v. Cohen, 225 F.3d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing a need
for evidentiary hearings in order to satisfy due process requirements).
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as irrelevant to the fairness of the proceeding, they may ignore it or decline
to delve into it.
There is a substantial body of literature regarding sanctions motions
against lawyers for various advocacy misconduct, such as frivolous filings,
misconduct regarding the disclosure and preservation of evidence, and
improper communications with witnesses.131 One may expect that advocates
accuse each other of such misconduct with some frequency partially because
of the perceived strategic benefit to discrediting the opposing lawyer.
Accusations that the opposing lawyer was untruthful may also be common,
particularly in the context of disagreements regarding compliance with
pretrial disclosure rules. The legal press often covers cases where lawyers
are accused of misconduct, giving the impression that allegations of
advocacy misconduct are frequently raised.132
Published judicial decisions sanctioning lawyers for advocacy
misconduct turn out to be relatively uncommon. In general, courts express the
view that disciplinary authorities have the principal responsibility to regulate
lawyers’ professional conduct, whereas the courts’ role is to resolve
lawsuits.133 Even when judges entertain sanctions motions, conduct necessary
hearings, and determine that the given lawyer engaged in overzealous
advocacy, judges may ultimately be reluctant to issue and publish opinions
because of the lasting reputational harm to the lawyer as well as the amount
of time required to write an opinion justifying the sanction.134
Judges have a professional obligation, under rules of judicial conduct,
to report serious lawyer misconduct to the relevant disciplinary authority
when the judge “knows” that the lawyer committed the misconduct,
typically as a result of a hearing into a misconduct allegation.135 Judges have
no obligation, however, to refer allegations of misconduct to the disciplinary
authority if the judge does not “know” that serious misconduct occurred.
131
For examples of such literature, see FLAMM, supra note 128, at 5–6; JAMIE S. GORELICK,
STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 9 (1989).
132
See supra notes 4–11 and accompanying text (providing examples of recently publicized calls
for discipline).
133
Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 76, at 82 n.72 (“[T]he general view of courts
[is] that it is not their role to oversee the ethics of the lawyers who practice before them, except insofar
as the purportedly unethical conduct affects the rights of the parties appearing before the court.”).
134
Most writing about judicial shaming as an under-utilized sanction against lawyers focuses on
prosecutorial misconduct. See generally Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of
Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305 (2016)
(describing how appellate judges shame prosecutors who defend wrongful convictions); Adam M.
Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1059 (2009) (discussing appellate judges’ reluctance to shame prosecutors who engage
in misconduct).
135
See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990, amended 2010) (“A judge
having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.”).
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Consequently, a judge may both decline to inquire into misconduct allegations
that are collateral to the lawsuit and decline to refer the allegations to a formal
disciplinary agency, leaving it to the party or lawyer who made the allegations
to complain, if they so desire.136 Even when they know of adversary
misconduct, if judges regard it as minor, as with most discovery abuse, courts
are unlikely to refer it to the disciplinary authorities.137
In many or most cases, a party who complained to the court about the
opposing lawyer will not couple or follow it with a complaint to the
disciplinary authority.138 There are a host of reasons why. First, as noted, the
disciplinary authority will probably not pursue the allegation while the
judicial proceeding is pending to avoid interfering with the judicial
proceeding and to conserve resources. Second, if the complaint is pursued,
the complainant may have to spend time providing information to the
disciplinary agency and the complainant’s own conduct may be challenged.
Third, the disciplinary authority has no ability to provide a remedy to the
complainant but may only issue a professional sanction against the offending
lawyer. Fourth, a complaint may appear to be vindictive or appear to be
designed to obtain improper leverage, and, by raising the level of
antagonism, it may make it harder for the complainant ultimately to
negotiate a favorable settlement with the opposing party. While there may
occasionally be some strategic benefit to a judicial sanctions motion directed
at an opposing lawyer’s overzealous conduct, there is usually little to be
gained, and much to be lost, by complaining to the disciplinary authority.
All of that is wholly apart from the perception, for which Section B shows
there is a strong foundation, that disciplinary authorities rarely sanction
lawyers for adversary misconduct.
B. Disciplinary Regulation of Overzealous Advocacy
The disciplinary rules are not meant to be enforced in every case.
Although every transgression subjects a lawyer to the possibility of
discipline, disciplinary authorities are expected to exercise discretion
regarding whether to pursue or impose discipline in a given case: “[T]he
[Model] Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed
for a violation . . . depend[s] on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness
136
See generally Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other
Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 766–69 (1997)
(discussing when judges’ duty to report misconduct arises); Arthur F. Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting of
Lawyer Misconduct, 77 UMKC L. REV. 537, 539–41 (2009) (showing that judges tend to underreport
lawyers’ misconduct).
137
See Schaefer, supra note 125, at 42 (concluding that “[f]ederal courts have largely ignored the
disciplinary system as a tool to address and deter document discovery misconduct”).
138
See Jim Goff, Comment, War Is Over: The Resolution for Attorney Discipline in Texas, 17 TEX.
TECH ADMIN. L.J. 83, 83–85 (2015) (describing that, in Texas, trial courts are reluctant to sanction lawyers
for discovery misconduct, but aggrieved parties are reluctant to complain to a disciplinary authority).
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and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have
been previous violations.”139 In this respect, disciplinary agencies function
like criminal prosecutors who choose which criminal offenders to prosecute
based on myriad factors, including the seriousness of the wrongdoing.140
Correspondingly, the disciplinary codes function like criminal laws, which
have pedagogic, expressive, and deterrent value, even when they are not
consistently enforced.141
Disciplinary authorities evidently exercise discretion robustly to weed
out cases involving advocacy misconduct. New York lawyers are rarely
disciplined for violating professional conduct rules regulating overzealous
advocacy. This is the case notwithstanding the assumption that many New
York advocates are aggressive, testing or crossing the lines drawn by the
rules, and notwithstanding the frequency with which lawyers accuse each
other of advocacy misconduct.
In 2017, the New York state courts issued decisions publicly disciplining
fewer than one hundred lawyers, out of approximately 175,000 lawyers who
were active and resided in the state.142 An electronic search of Appellate
Division decisions published in 2017 yielded ninety-seven decisions imposing
public discipline—censure, suspension, or disbarment.143 In sixty-three of the
ninety-seven New York disciplinary decisions, either the lawyer in question
was not a litigator or the underlying misconduct was not related in any
discernable way to the lawyer’s work in litigation.144 In most cases, the
139

MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Scope ¶ 19.
See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5
(1940) (“What every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases for prosecution and to
select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most
certain.”); see generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public
Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 591 n.3 (2019) [hereinafter Green, Prosecutorial Discretion] (citing
authority on prosecutorial discretion).
141
See Bruce A. Green & Lara Bazelon, Restorative Justice from Prosecutors’ Perspective, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2291 (2020) (“The objectives of criminal punishment include incapacitating
dangerous offenders, deterring future wrongdoers, securing retribution, reinforcing the societal norms
expressed in the criminal law, and rehabilitating offenders, although, in practice, prosecution and
imprisonment do little to rehabilitate offenders and may be counterproductive.”) (footnotes omitted).
142
After Washington, D.C., New York has the highest number of U.S. lawyers per capita. AM. BAR
ASS’N, PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2021 11 (2021), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/news/2021/0721/polp.pdf.
143
The research conducted through the Westlaw database began with a search of 2017 decisions of
the New York State Appellate Division containing the phrase “Rules of Professional Conduct.” It was
assumed that any disciplinary decision would reference these Rules. This search yielded 168 opinions,
of which twenty did not arise from the disciplinary process but rather involved appellate review of
litigation. Of the remaining 148 decisions arising from the disciplinary process, twenty-two were rulings
on motions to resign from the bar for non-disciplinary reasons. These short decisions revealed little or
nothing about whatever disciplinary issues may have underlain the lawyers’ motions. Twenty-nine other
decisions addressed motions for reinstatement to the bar in cases where lawyers had previously been
suspended, typically for noncompliance with registration requirements.
144
See id.
140
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misconduct related to some other area of legal practice, such as transactional
practice, or it related to work as a fiduciary outside law practice. In several
cases, the lawyer was sanctioned for misconduct unrelated to professional
work, such as driving while intoxicated.
That leaves thirty-four cases of public discipline in the year 2017 that
involved misconduct having some relationship, however tangential, to the
lawyer’s work as an advocate in judicial proceedings.145 Notably, in most of
these cases—twenty-one cases of thirty-four—the relevant conduct was
primarily aimed at the lawyer’s client and not, except perhaps incidentally, at
the court, the opposing party, or another third party.146 None of these cases
involved overzealousness in pursuit of the client’s interests.147 More than half
of these cases principally involved a lack of zealousness—incompetence or
neglect of the client’s cause.148 In some of these cases, the lawyer’s neglect
was coupled with related deficiencies, such as inadequate or misleading
communications with the client.149 In a typical case, the lawyer was hired to
pursue a lawsuit, never commenced the lawsuit, ignored the client’s requests
for updates, and misled the client about the status of the lawsuit.150
Other cases of clients victimized by litigators principally involved
financial misconduct, such as misappropriating or mishandling client funds
or making impermissible loans to the client.151 One case included an
145

Id.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See, e.g., In re Tarter, 65 N.Y.S.3d 200, 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (disbarring an
attorney for neglecting clients’ cases, charging illegal fees, and other misconduct); In re McGrath, 63
N.Y.S.3d 56, 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for neglecting a client’s
legal matter and failing to keep the client reasonably informed about such legal matter, which adversely
reflected on the lawyer’s fitness); In re Pierre, 62 N.Y.S.3d 62, 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam)
(disbarring an attorney for failing to act with diligence and promptness, failing to keep a client informed,
and commingling client funds with attorney funds, among other things); In re Marshall, 57 N.Y.S.3d
476, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for neglecting a client’s matter and
falsifying settlement documents); In re Stasiuk, 57 N.Y.S.3d 485, 485–86 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per
curiam) (censuring an attorney for failing to refund money to a client, but not suspending the attorney
because the attorney was already suspended in the state); In re Meagher, 67 N.Y.S.3d 361, 363–64 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for failing to communicate with a client, failing to
remit funds to a client, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); In re Bartley,
53 N.Y.S.3d 643, 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for neglecting a
client’s matter, failing to provide competent representation, failing to act with reasonable diligence, and
failing to promptly comply with the client’s requests for information).
150
In re Penkovsky, 68 N.Y.S.3d 77, 78–79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
151
See, e.g., In re Napolitano, 68 N.Y.S.3d 143, 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam)
(suspending an attorney who refused to remit funds to a client) ; In re Bhukta, 56 N.Y.S.3d 878, 879
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for three years for the misappropriation of
a client’s funds); In re Taller, 54 N.Y.S.3d 152, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an
attorney for one year for this misappropriation of a client’s funds); In re Fitzgerald, 51 N.Y.S.3d 748,
748 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for advancing financial assistance to
certain clients while representing them in connection with contemplated and pending litigation); In re
146
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impermissible sexual relationship with the client.
Another litigator’s
various misconduct included removing the client’s litigation file from her
office without authorization and later discarding or destroying it.153
Only thirteen disciplinary decisions involved misconduct by advocates
in which the court or a third party was, at least arguably, a victim.154 In most
of these, however, the client was not the beneficiary. In two cases, the client
was the principal victim; one lawyer was censured for neglecting clients’
cases, which included multiple failures to comply with court orders,155 and
another lawyer was suspended for neglecting clients’ litigation by failing to
appear in court and failing to file timely papers, thereby prejudicing the
client and the administration of justice.156 In other cases, the lawyer was the
principal beneficiary of misconduct aimed at others. For example, a lawyer
was suspended for one year for lying to a federal court that was investigating
misconduct by the lawyer; the misconduct under investigation did involve
advocacy, but the lawyer concealed and falsified information to extract a
favorable settlement for a client.157 Another lawyer was suspended for three
years for various misconduct unrelated to advocacy and for deceiving a
prison official in order to visit a client.158 A third, having forgotten to secure
a client’s signature on a document and unwilling to visit the client in jail,
falsified the client’s signature and notarized it; the lawyer was censured.159
None of these can fairly be called examples of overly zealous advocacy in
pursuit of litigants’ interests.
In only five cases it might be said that lawyers acted over-zealously on
behalf of a client in litigation:
•

In a bankruptcy court hearing where the trustee sought
production of the client’s cell phone, the lawyer made
deceptive arguments that concealed the fact that the
client had lost the phone, then produced a different phone
from the one that the court ordered to be produced. The
lawyer was censured.160

Perchekly, 49 N.Y.S.3d 99, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for
misappropriation of client funds and misconduct regarding bank records); In re Feng Li, 49 N.Y.S.3d
548, 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for three years for the
misappropriation of client funds).
152
In re DiStefano, 61 N.Y.S.3d 514, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
153
In re Groom, 51 N.Y.S.3d 622, 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
154
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
155
In re Gluck, 59 N.Y.S.3d 368, 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
156
In re Schatkin, 50 N.Y.S.3d 442, 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
157
In re Gilly, 52 N.Y.S.3d 4, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
158
In re Crutcher, 60 N.Y.S.3d 621, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
159
In re Dittakavi, 62 N.Y.S.3d 463, 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
160
In re Aviles, 56 N.Y.S.3d 104, 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
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•

A lawyer was suspended for three years for helping a client
violate a court order and knowingly making false factual
assertions in an appeal.161

•

A lawyer was censured for improperly meeting with a
client’s child, who was independently represented by
counsel, and for impeding the other counsel’s access to
the child.162

•

A lawyer was censured for improperly endorsing a check
and distributing marital property to the client, in violation
of a court rule, without first obtaining court approval or
notifying the opposing party or counsel.163

•

A lawyer was suspended for three years for sending vulgar
and insulting communications to an adversary in
litigation, as well as for failing to cooperate with the
investigation and failing to register.164
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There is no reason to assume that a higher proportion of cases
culminating in private discipline involved overzealous advocacy. Most of
the annual reports do not identify the conduct that led to a private sanction
or warning. The exceptions are the reports of the Committee on Professional
Standards of the Third Judicial Department, which has jurisdiction over the
state capital of Albany and the surrounding area north of New York City. Its
2014 Annual Report Concerning Attorney Discipline, for example, briefly
describes the conduct underlying the imposition of “private discipline” in
sixty-six cases—including seven oral admonitions, ten letters of admonition,
twenty-five letters of caution, and twenty-four letters of education—not all
of which technically qualify as “discipline.”165 Five of the cases may
possibly have involved overzealous advocacy on a client’s behalf. These
were described as involving undignified conduct towards another attorney
(though it is not indicated whether this occurred in the advocacy context);
falsely affixing a witness’s signature to a document; threatening criminal
charges to gain an advantage in a lawsuit; improperly participating in an
individual’s defense; and initiating a verbal confrontation with an opposing
party in a court facility.166

161

In re Etah, 45 N.Y.S.3d 573, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
In re Hartwich, 68 N.Y.S.3d 192, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
163
In re Krzys, 51 N.Y.S.3d 260, 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
164
In re Johnson, 51 N.Y.S.3d 746, 746 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (per curiam).
165
THIRD JUD. DEP’T 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 8–12.
166
Id. at 10–12.
162
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF SELECTIVE DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
Although courts may sanction advocates who act overzealously in
pursuit of their clients’ interests, courts use this power sparingly, leaving it
to disciplinary agencies to regulate advocates and other members of the bar.
Disciplinary agencies have ample authority to regulate advocates since
disciplinary rules reach most of what might be adversary misconduct. Yet,
as the New York example illustrates, the disciplinary process rarely
generates discipline in cases of overzealous advocacy. This observation may
not surprise advocates, but it may surprise members of the public and
perhaps even members of the bar generally, and it seems inconsistent with
the aspirations for a professional disciplinary process.167
Because state disciplinary authorities are not expected to file charges
whenever they find misconduct, they exercise discretion in most or all cases.
They will have to exercise discretion one way or another, for example, in
response to complaints against Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, and other
lawyers whose legal challenges to the 2020 presidential election results were
rejected. State disciplinary authorities in New York and elsewhere will have
to decide whether to treat these cases like most others involving allegedly
frivolous filings or to make an exception by bringing charges against the
plaintiffs’ lawyers.
The public will eventually notice the outcome. The allegations will linger
in the public consciousness, as there will be ongoing reminders of the election
fraud litigation that may have helped incite violence at the Capitol by giving
currency to claims of election fraud. In particular, the Trial Memorandum of
the United States House of Representatives in the Impeachment Trial of
President Donald J. Trump offered the following reminder:
President Trump and his allies ultimately filed [sixty-two]
lawsuits in state and federal courts contesting every aspect of
those elections. But all of these suits were dismissed, save for
one marginal Pennsylvania suit that did not affect the outcome
there. In dismissing these suits, judges at all levels—including
several of President Trump’s own judicial appointees—found
that his claims were “not credible,” “without merit,” and “flat
out wrong.” Courts warned that some of his suits improperly
167

There is a considerable body of literature observing that, both in and out of the disciplinary
context, the advocacy rules have traditionally been under-enforced against prosecutors in particular.
Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 61,
61 n.55 (2016) (“The theme of the early professional literature was that rogue prosecutors were not being
meaningfully held accountable for their misconduct because no potential regulatory mechanism was
being effectively employed to deter or sanction prosecutors’ wrongdoing. In effect, judicial sanction,
civil liability, professional discipline, and internal discipline added up to very little.”). The writings
assume that disciplinary authorities are reluctant to charge prosecutors in particular, but it may be that,
in deference to the courts, disciplinary agencies are reluctant to police overzealous advocates in general.
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aimed to “breed confusion,” “undermine the public’s trust in
the election,” and “ignore the will of millions of voters.” As
Judge Stephanos Bibas (a Trump appointee) observed in one
characteristic opinion: “Free, fair elections are the lifeblood of
our democracy. Charges of unfairness are serious. But calling
an election unfair does not make it so. Charges require specific
allegations and then proof. We have neither here.”168
Given the public prominence of the lawsuits’ spectacular failure, the public
will be keenly interested in the disciplinary authorities’ responses.
This Part explores four questions raised by the selective enforcement of
rules on overzealous advocacy, and, in exploring these questions, it
references the discretionary decision that authorities must make regarding
whether to formally charge lawyers for filing frivolous lawsuits seeking to
overturn the 2020 presidential election result. Section A asks whether
disciplinary rule drafters should eliminate advocacy rules, such as the rule
against taking frivolous positions in court, that deservedly are
under-enforced. Section B asks whether conduct that deserves to be
punished is falling through the cracks because disciplinary agencies and
judges defer to each other to enforce the relevant advocacy rules. Section C
asks whether, in cases of advocates’ misconduct, disciplinary authorities can
be expected to exercise their charging discretion in a principled, fair, and
unbiased manner. Finally, Section D asks whether the opacity of state
disciplinary processes undermines public and professional confidence that
disciplinary discretion is, in fact, exercised fairly.
A. Codifying Insignificant Advocacy Rules
One likely reason that advocacy rules are rarely enforced by disciplinary
authorities is that the misconduct in question often is not serious enough to
justify a disciplinary sanction. For example, an advocate may, in theory, be
disciplined for failing to cite important precedent, questioning witnesses
without an adequate factual basis, or appealing to jurors’ sympathies, but
courts and disciplinary authorities rarely regard this misconduct as serious
enough to warrant discipline.169 This misconduct is equivalent to minor
procedural rule violations that recur in litigation; it rarely raises doubts about
168
Trial Memorandum of the U.S. House of Reps. in the Impeachment Trial of President Donald J.
Trump at 7–8, In re Impeachment of President Donald J. Trump (2021) (quoting Bibas, J.).
169
See Green, Prosecutors’ Misconduct, supra note 126, 811–12 (“Like prosecutors themselves,
disciplinary authorities exercise discretion in deciding when to bring charges. In doing so, authorities
ordinarily take account of the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the extent of the wrongdoer’s
culpability. There are few cases of public discipline imposed against civil litigators for low-level
misconduct such as discovery abuse or frivolous filings, notwithstanding the perception that this
misconduct is rife. Disciplinary authorities reserve their efforts for more serious wrongdoing. Because
prosecutors’ forensic misconduct is often unpremeditated and its impact is often insignificant,
disciplinary authorities tend to disregard it.”) (footnotes omitted).
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the lawyer’s general honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice. The
applicable rules are equivalent to regulatory infractions, as opposed to
felonies or even misdemeanors under criminal law. It would be
disproportionately harsh for lawyers to be disciplined, even privately, for
these lapses unless they occurred habitually, in which event the conduct
might reflect general indifference to applicable procedural regulations. In
other words, to a large extent, the lack of discipline for advocacy misconduct
is not attributable to inadequate enforcement by disciplinary agencies but to
over-regulation by disciplinary rules.
The New York Rules’ inclusion of rarely enforced provisions is largely
an accident of the history discussed earlier.170 In the twentieth century, the
advocacy norms were incorporated into professional codes—first in the
Canons, then in the Model Code—because they were not codified in any
other accessible writing.171 The early professional codes served an
educational purpose and guided lawyers in regulating their own conduct.
Although the professional codes are now primarily meant to serve as the
basis for discipline, they still include provisions on advocacy carried over
from 110 years ago.172 The rule drafters may be wrong to assume that no
harm is done by disciplinary rules that, for good reason, disciplinary
agencies rarely enforce. One risk is that the lack of disciplinary enforcement
will send the wrong signal to lawyers. Lawyers may read the lack of
disciplinary enforcement as an expression by an authoritative body that the
advocacy rules are unimportant and that compliance is unnecessary.
Disciplinary agencies’ lack of enforcement may also be taken as an
expression that certain adversary conduct is permissible when, in fact, it is
impermissible but relatively insignificant. Either way, the inclusion of
unenforced disciplinary rules may detract from the seriousness of the
underlying normative expectations. This would be somewhat paradoxical
since the advocacy norms are codified in disciplinary rules, not merely in
other writings, to underscore their importance.
Another risk is that judges may receive the wrong signal. Disciplinary
agencies may assume that judges will enforce the relevant rules through the
imposition of litigation sanctions, which may appear to be the more measured
approach to enforcement. But courts may misinterpret the agencies’ inaction.
Judges may be reluctant to impose sanctions because the normative standards
are incorporated in disciplinary rules, not in procedural rules or decisional law,
and may therefore defer to disciplinary agencies’ greater expertise.
Alternatively, judges may interpret disciplinary non-enforcement as a signal
that the relevant normative standards should not be enforced at all.
170

See discussion supra Part I.B.
Id.
172
Over time, additions have been made to the rules regulating advocacy. For example, most
provisions regulating prosecutors are relatively recent. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, r. 3.8. The more
recent rules are not necessarily enforced more often than the ones with earlier origins.
171
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Finally, and most worryingly, the public may misconstrue the disciplinary
authorities’ inaction. Members of the public may assume that the disciplinary
rules in question are more important than they are and that they deserve to be
enforced. If the public perceives that advocates frequently violate certain rules
with impunity, it may conclude that lawyers are scofflaws, that they are
inadequately regulated, and that the rules should be enforced by a legislative
or administrative body that is not dominated by lawyers and judges. That is,
non-enforcement of insignificant rules may undermine public respect for the
legal profession and foster public skepticism of whether the profession
deserves to be self-regulating.
The allegations that Giuliani, Powell, and others violated the rule against
frivolous pleadings illustrate these problems. Disciplinary authorities may
opt to spare themselves the labor of analyzing whether the election fraud
cases were frivolous or merely resounding losers. Based on conventional
practice, and for consistency’s sake, disciplinary authorities may conclude
that lawyers should not be charged based on a single frivolous lawsuit. But
members of the public who are hostile to lawyers and their work may
perceive that the disciplinary authorities are not taking lawyers’ misconduct
seriously for reasons that the public could only speculate.
This raises the question whether rule drafters should eliminate advocacy
rules that are not important enough to be enforced in the disciplinary process.
The relevant normative standards may be better expressed elsewhere to
educate lawyers about normative expectations or to serve as a basis for
litigation sanctions. Depending on their function, the normative standards
may be incorporated in judicial decisions, court rules, procedural rules, or
bar association guidelines.173 While rule drafters may assume that preserving
the rules on advocacy misconduct augments the rules’ significance, public
confidence is shaken when courts publish disciplinary rules that their
disciplinary arms do not enforce, even if for good reason.
B. Underenforcing Significant Advocacy Rules
Even when significant wrongdoing occurs in litigation, disciplinary
authorities may decline to bring charges. In general, disciplinary agencies
defer inquiring into allegations of wrongdoing in pending cases. But, even
afterwards, if the complaint returns, authorities may decline to bring formal
charges if the trial court did not refer the matter to the disciplinary authority.
For example, if the trial court examined the allegation and rejected it,

173
Bar associations may be unenthusiastic about trimming down the disciplinary codes, given their
responsibility for them in the first place.
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disciplinary authorities will likely defer to the court’s determination,
especially in the absence of new facts.174
If the allegation was made during litigation and the court ignored it, the
disciplinary agency may infer that the court considered the allegation
implausible or considered the alleged misconduct to be too insignificant to
warrant a sanction, and the agency may elect to respect the court’s implicit
judgment. If the relevant facts were known, but never called to the court’s
attention, the agency may ignore a complaint to discourage forum shopping
and to encourage complainants to go to the court in the first instance. If the
court conducted a hearing, found misconduct, and imposed a sanction, the
agency might conclude that the lawyer has already been adequately punished
and that further discipline would be disproportionately harsh and unnecessary
to further the ends of the disciplinary process. All in all, both to respect the
courts and to conserve resources, disciplinary authorities consider most
advocacy misconduct to be a matter for the courts, rather than the disciplinary
authorities, except when the courts explicitly instruct them otherwise.
The calculus changes when the trial court makes a referral, as in the
cases of federal district courts in Michigan and the District of Columbia, that
referred plaintiffs’ lawyers in election litigation to the disciplinary
authorities. Disciplinary agencies serve under the judiciary and do not want
to incur judges’ disfavor by ignoring their referrals. Judges are ordinarily
accorded respect, and their referrals can be presumed to be less biased than
those of opposing parties or opposing counsel and to be predicated on
knowledge of the relevant facts and expertise regarding the relevant
standards of conduct. Disciplinary agencies also might not want to
discourage judges from reporting misconduct in the future. Further, where,
as in the Michigan case, the referral is preceded by the court’s own findings
of misconduct, a disciplinary authority can ease its burden by drawing on
the judicial record and giving weight to the court’s finding.
There are other reasons why, in general, disciplinary authorities might
ordinarily expect courts to take the lead in responding to advocacy
misconduct, except where it is serious enough to call for a suspension or
disbarment. Of course, discipline is the only feasible or useful response to
truly serious misconduct that shows that the lawyer is dangerous. For
example, disciplinary action is necessary when serious misconduct, such as
committing perjury or threatening witnesses, warrants a suspension or
disbarment to protect proceedings. But, otherwise, courts can impose
litigation sanctions that are as effective as disciplinary sanctions. Further, it
may be more efficient and cost-effective for courts to adjudicate claims of
adversary misconduct; courts can resolve the issues more expeditiously than
174
William Wernz, What Would a Discipline Office Do? Examining the High-Profile Complaints
Against Election Attorneys from a Lawyer Regulatory Perspective, MSBA: C MTYS. (Mar. 15, 2021, 5:26
PM), https://my.mnbar.org/blogs/william-wernz/2021/03/15/what-would-a-discipline-office-do-examining
-the-hi (“A Rule 3.1 charge is seldom brought without a prior civil finding.”).
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disciplinary authorities that wait until litigation ends, and, in court, the cost
of investigating and establishing alleged misconduct is largely borne by a
party that has the incentive to raise the allegation. Disciplinary agencies have
limited resources that they use selectively, as do criminal prosecutors, and
they have reasons not to prioritize cases of advocacy misconduct, even if
they believe a disciplinary sanction is deserved.
Trial judges, however, may not share disciplinary agencies’ view that
courts should accept primary responsibility for disciplining errant advocates.
They may take the view that disciplinary agencies have greater expertise or
that judges’ time is better spent focusing on more important matters. When
trial judges do not make referrals, they may be, at most, agnostic or
indifferent or they may nevertheless expect disciplinary authorities to deal
with the allegations of advocacy misconduct. A court may assume that the
disciplinary authority has the principal role in enforcing the relevant rules
and assume that a referral is therefore unnecessary. The court may decline
to make a referral out of fairness to the lawyer in question, as a court’s
referral may be misread as a predetermination that the lawyer engaged in
misconduct and/or deserves a disciplinary sanction when, in fact, the court
has not made any such determination. For these reasons and perhaps others,
disciplinary authorities’ decision to not pursue wrongdoing in litigation may
reflect a misreading of the judges who oversaw the litigation in question.175
In the case of the election lawsuits, for example, a sanctions motion was
brought in few of the sixty-two lawsuits176 perhaps because most of the public
officials in charge of defending the lawsuits saw no value in prolonging the
litigation by seeking to punish the lawyers. These officials, all in swing states,
may have doubted whether a sanctions motion would prevail, but the
motivation was more likely political; the officials might have worried that
175

Further, trial judges almost certainly have different views on whether to refer lawyers to
disciplinary authorities, and one might question whether disciplinary authorities should treat similar cases
differently depending on the trial judges’ views regarding the utility of discipline as a response to
overzealous advocacy.
176
A motion for Rule 11 sanctions was brought by the City of Detroit, an intervenor, in the federal
lawsuit challenging the election results in Michigan. City of Detroit’s Motion for Sanctions, for
Disciplinary Action, for Disbarment Referral and for Referral to State Bar Disciplinary Bodies at iii,
King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-13134). Pennsylvania authorities
sought sanctions in Colorado federal courts against two attorneys for the plaintiffs in an election
challenge, alleging that the attorneys “made demonstrably false accusations to advance frivolous legal
arguments. . . . for a dangerous purpose: to attack the Pennsylvania defendants’ administration of the
2020 election and to undermine faith in the results of that election.” Governor Tom Wolf’s and Former
Secretary Kathy Boockvar’s Motion for Sanctions at 1, O’Rourke v. Dominion Voting Sys. Inc., No. 20cv-03747-NRN, 2021 WL 3400671 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2021). A Georgia county official named in an
election challenge sought an award of legal fees and court costs as a sanction against the plaintiffs and
their lawyers for asserting claims for which “there was a complete absence of justiciable law or fact,”
such that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept the asserted claims. Respondent
Erica Hamilton’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 at 2, Trump v.
Raffensperger, No. 2020-CV-343255 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2021).
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many voters would disfavor a punitive motion, or the officials may have
thought it unwise to continue providing a judicial forum for baseless election
fraud allegations. It may have independently occurred to some of the judges
in these cases that the public needed protection from the plaintiffs’ lawyers or
that other lawyers should be deterred from bringing equally baseless litigation.
But few imposed sanctions or made disciplinary referrals.177
Of course, the disciplinary authorities are aware of the post-election
lawsuits and do not need a judicial referral to respond. But the disciplinary
authorities, who are under the auspices of state judiciaries, might
erroneously infer that the trial judges did not believe that sanctions were
warranted. If so, the disciplinary authorities might give weight, or even
entire deference, to the trial courts’ judgment. After all, a trial judge who has
reviewed the plaintiffs’ pleadings is in the better position to assess whether
the claims were merely meritless or frivolous and therefore sanctionable.
There is a high likelihood in this situation, however, that a disciplinary
authority will misread the court, which may be indifferent or may favor
disciplinary proceedings but simply be disinclined to initiate them.
State courts should rethink the Alphonse-Gaston routine staged by trial
judges and disciplinary agencies, both of which are under the aegis of a
judiciary (and often the same judiciary). Otherwise, the paradox will
continue: two regulators are less effective than one, as trial judges and
disciplinary agencies defer to each other to enforce disciplinary rules in
situations where enforcement is warranted, and no enforcement occurs. For
starters, better communication is needed between trial courts and
disciplinary agencies. They need to reach an understanding regarding which
body will take regulatory responsibility for cases of potentially significant
adversary misconduct, so that cases worthy of discipline do not fall through
the cracks. Furthermore, they, of course, need to implement whatever
protocols they adopt.
C. Arbitrary Enforcement
Though under-explored and under-theorized, disciplinary discretion is a
central aspect of disciplinary enforcement. For example, regardless of
whether complaints are filed against the lawyers who brought meritless
election fraud cases, disciplinary authorities face a discretionary decision.
Disciplinary authorities read judicial decisions and the news, and they have
authority to investigate allegations of professional misconduct that are
thereby called to their attention. Although disciplinary authorities rarely
initiate charges when lawyers file frivolous complaints,178 they have
authority to do so if their examination of the court record and any additional
investigations lead them to conclude that the plaintiffs’ lawyers ran afoul of
177
178

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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a disciplinary rule. Therefore, disciplinary prosecutors must decide whether
to initiate formal disciplinary charges in these cases.
Published procedures governing the disciplinary process do not direct or
cabin disciplinary prosecutors’ discretion, and disciplinary prosecutors do
not publish the decision-making criteria that they generally employ. Subject
to their internal decision-making and review processes, disciplinary
authorities may make decisions on an ad hoc basis, employing criteria that
change from case to case or that are inconsistently applied. In unusual cases,
such as the election fraud cases, disciplinary authorities may take account of
unique considerations or may ignore unique considerations simply because
they do not fit into the authorities’ customary analysis.
There are many reasons—some more compelling than others and some
more unusual than others—why disciplinary authorities might exercise
discretion not to bring charges for filing frivolous election fraud cases, even
if they conclude that the plaintiffs’ lawyers violated a rule. Most obviously,
as already discussed, filing frivolous lawsuits is not ordinarily as harmful as
the misconduct that disciplinary authorities focus on, such as
misappropriation of client funds. The disciplinary prosecutors may decide
that the frivolous filings were no more harmful to the courts in the election
fraud cases than in usual cases and that it would therefore be arbitrary,
unprincipled, and/or discriminatory to single out these plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Absent a principled way to distinguish these cases, formal disciplinary
charges may be, or appear to be, an unjustifiable response to public pressure
or a discriminatory action based on the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ unsympathetic
political beliefs, political objectives, or clients.
Alternatively, disciplinary authorities may regard this misconduct as
best left to courts to address, as is often true of advocacy misconduct. Courts
have authority and an incentive to sanction lawyers who waste their time
with baseless pleadings, applications, and arguments. Additionally, it is
more efficient for courts to sanction this misconduct than for disciplinary
authorities to do so. Courts are already familiar with the relevant facts; they
are in a better position to assess the extent of the lawyers’ culpability and
the extent to which the judicial process was impaired; and the judicial
sanctioning process is less cumbersome. As discussed, if courts decline to
punish lawyers who file frivolous papers or engage in other judicial
misconduct, disciplinary authorities may interpret that as an expression, to
which they might defer, that the wrongdoing does not deserve punishment.
Further, viewing the accusations of frivolous lawsuits independently of
other allegations of misconduct, disciplinary authorities may perceive unique
reasons why these cases are particularly inappropriate for discipline. When the
lawsuits were filed immediately after the election, President Trump and others
publicly insisted that the election had been stolen because of varieties of
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election fraud, and many members of the public accepted these claims.
There was a public interest in resolving doubts quickly, as state officials would
soon certify the election results, and to do so through litigation, which most of
the public would rightly consider more trustworthy and reliable than the
political process. While plaintiffs’ lawyers usually have time to gather facts
before filing litigation, the timing here required quick action.
A disciplinary sanction would mean, in effect, that the lawyers could not
bring these sorts of election challenges to the courts because, as gatekeepers,
lawyers must protect the courts from arguments that are so sure to fail that
they would waste judicial resources. While the lawsuits, collectively, may
have wasted judicial resources and may have been part of a strategy to
delegitimize the election results that led to the violent entry of the United
States Capitol on January 6, 2021, the counterargument is that courtrooms
are precisely where this issue should have been resolved. While the courts’
rulings did not convince every partisan—and, certainly, President Trump
himself never publicly accepted them—there was a public interest in having
the election challenges aired in court. There, unlike in the public square, the
plaintiffs’ lawyers were called on to support their election fraud claims with
evidence (and failed to do so), and the claims were reviewed and resolved
by judges, who generally command public respect for their neutrality and
detachment and whose public rationales could be critiqued. Disciplinary
authorities might well conclude that parties and counsel need more leeway
than the disciplinary rules afford when claims relate to pressing, contested,
volatile political issues that must quickly be resolved, whether in the courts
of law, the political process, or the streets.180
At the same time, one can see why disciplinary authorities might pursue
disciplinary charges against the lawyers who brought frivolous challenges
to the 2020 presidential election, even though few advocates who make
legally or factually frivolous arguments are publicly disciplined. The
election fraud claims may seem more frivolous, or more obviously frivolous,
particularly after courts rejected dozens of them. The litigation strategy may
seem particularly harmful to the public interest whether because the lawsuits
were designed to discredit a democratic election or because some of the
lawyers may have been aware that they were fueling unlawful, and even
violent, extrajudicial efforts to overturn the election results. Alternatively, if
the disciplinary authorities charge the lawyers in question with other
misconduct, they might add a charge concerning frivolous litigation for
strategic reasons—e.g., to build pressure for the lawyers to negotiate a
179
Glenn Kessler & Salvador Rizzo, President Trump’s False Claims of Vote Fraud: A
Chronology, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2020, 5:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/
05/president-trumps-false-claims-vote-fraud-chronology/.
180
See generally Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated Suits, Rule
11, and the First Amendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1, 96 (“[A]t least some aspects of Rule 11 are fatally
flawed and . . . the courts must tolerate some politically motivated lawsuits”).

2022]

SELECTIVELY DISCIPLINING ADVOCATES

189

resolution. Additionally, the disciplinary authorities may decide to bring
charges and allow the courts to resolve them, simply to escape criticism. By
passing the buck to the court, disciplinary counsel may avoid being accused
of abusing their discretion by playing favorites or playing politics.
Additional considerations might push disciplinary prosecutors one way
or the other. The election fraud cases present an unusual and difficult
question of discretion. Perhaps most cases are easy; either it is obvious that
there was no wrongdoing or only technical or insignificant wrongdoing that
is unworthy of punishment, or, in the minority of cases, it is obvious that
there was serious wrongdoing that demands discipline. But there are sure to
be many other cases, and plausible arguments can be made for exercising
discretion in alternative ways.
Disciplinary discretion presents all the risks that come with
prosecutorial and other administrative discretion, particularly where there
are no enforceable criteria for its exercise or no published criteria at all.181
There is a risk that disciplinary authorities will make arbitrary decisions or
treat similarly situated lawyers differently based on illegitimate criteria.182
There is also a risk of excessive harshness in pursuing charges or excessive
leniency in not doing so. For example, one can imagine disciplinary
prosecutors singling out some of the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the post-election
cases simply because a disciplinary decision will receive attention within the
legal profession, just as criminal prosecutors selectively prosecute certain
white-collar crimes to deter others from similar misconduct.183 Or, even
more questionably, some may bring formal charges because it would be
interesting, give rise to good stories, and attract professional attention if the
charges are successfully prosecuted. In short, discretion creates the risk that
discretion will be abused.
One might raise similar concerns about criminal prosecutors’ charging
discretion, but disciplinary prosecutors are under even less constraint and
scrutiny than criminal prosecutors, with the result being that there are even
weaker incentives for them to exercise principled, fair, and consistent
discretion. Because criminal prosecutors’ offices and criminal prosecutors
themselves have a long tradition of exercising discretion, public and
181
With respect to prosecutorial discretion in particular, the leading criticism remains that of
Professor Vorenberg four decades ago. See generally James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981). With respect to administrative discretion in
general, the seminal work was by Professor Davis more than a half century ago. See generally KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
182
This concern was reinforced by a 2019 study of the California disciplinary process that
confirmed the perception that attorneys of color were over-represented in the disciplinary system.
Memorandum from Dag MacLeod, Chief of Mission Advancement & Accountability Div., & Ron Pi,
Principal Analyst, Off. of Rsch. & Institutional Accountability, to State Bar of Cal. Members & Bd. of
Trs. (Nov. 14, 2019).
183
John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 723, 750–54 (1982) (identifying reasons for not consistently enforcing white-collar crimes).
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professional expectations have developed over time and, to some extent,
have been codified or collected.184 Particularly in recent years, the subject of
prosecutorial discretion has been debated publicly in elections for chief
prosecutor, and it has been discussed by law reform organizations,
journalists, and others.185 There is public pressure on criminal prosecutors to
announce their general charging criteria and, because criminal prosecutions
command public attention, there is some public scrutiny of criminal
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions.186 Although criminal prosecutors’
decision-making tends to be publicly inaccessible, the decisions generally
are not and, in some contexts, criminal prosecutors may or must publicly
explain their decisions and allow judges to publicly review their
explanations.187 All of this said, criminal prosecutors have never developed
a national consensus about how to best use their discretionary power; they
are only minimally accountable; and there is considerable public controversy
about the fairness of their discretionary decisions.188
The problem is even more dire for disciplinary counsel, who have
largely escaped public and professional scrutiny. There is no evidence that
the courts that delegate authority to disciplinary prosecutors can or do
exercise meaningful oversight of discretionary charging decisions.
Disciplinary agencies are under no discernable public or professional
pressure to adopt decision-making principles, to announce them to the public
or to the profession, or to adhere to them. Disciplinary counsel has even
more latitude than criminal prosecutors to make arbitrary, biased, unfair, or
unprincipled decisions. Even the most thoughtful, well-intentioned
disciplinary counsel, in tough cases, are likely to make ad hoc decisions that
allow room for a host of biases, if only unconscious ones. In the cases of
lawyers accused of bringing frivolous challenges to the 2020 presidential
election, for example, disciplinary authorities’ own political preferences
may influence their decisions one way or another.189 Conversely, out of
concern for avoiding the influence or the appearance of political biases,
some disciplinary authorities may bend over backwards to make a decision
that is contrary to their political preference.
It is not a foregone conclusion that disciplinary agencies should have
discretion to simply decline cases where overzealous advocacy has occurred
based on the theory that the misconduct was insignificant or on other
theories. It is, of course, the settled understanding in the United States that
criminal prosecutors can and should decline to bring cases in many situations
184
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where crimes have occurred, but that is not the practice everywhere. So,
the analogy between disciplinary and criminal prosecutions may be
imperfect. While criminal prosecutions, which can result in harsh direct and
collateral consequences, are often disproportionate to the wrongdoing that
has occurred, the same is less likely to be true of disciplinary prosecutions.
In the disciplinary process, there is a broader range of sanctions, some of
which are confidential, such as private reprimands; there is also a range of
confidential responses, such as letters of caution and letters of education,
that do not count as sanctions under the law.191 Of course, formal charges do
not have to result in any of these if an adjudicator determines that no
wrongdoing occurred or that no punishment or other response is warranted.
To be sure, disciplinary agencies undoubtedly have resource limitations.
But, if there are too many lawyers committing too much misconduct in
litigation, the answer is not necessarily to exercise charging discretion. An
alternative worth considering would be to eliminate disciplinary rules
dealing with adversary misconduct that is better addressed exclusively by
courts. Trial judges could expand their sanctioning role to cover wrongdoing
over which they have exclusive authority. State judiciaries and legislatures
could devote adequate resources to the disciplinary processes to enable them
to address serious litigation misconduct encompassed by the remaining
rules. The objective would be to ensure that all significant advocacy
misconduct is addressed by one institution or the other and that insignificant
misconduct is eliminated from the disciplinary code and defined elsewhere.
This approach would address not only the perception that disciplinary
authorities ignore scofflaws or single out some minor offenders, but also the
general concern about arbitrary discretion.
D. Compounding the Problems: The Opacity of Disciplinary Discretion
All of the problems posed by disciplinary discretion are exacerbated by
the opacity of the disciplinary process. In Arizona, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Texas, for example, the public will
ultimately learn whether the lawyers who allegedly made frivolous
assertions in election challenges are publicly disciplined.192 But that is only
the tip of the iceberg. If no public discipline is reported, the public may not
know whether disciplinary authorities declined to file charges, whether a
disciplinary prosecution resulted in a lawyer’s exoneration, or whether a
private sanction was issued. If the lawyers forgo confidentiality and selfreport that the disciplinary authorities declined to file charges, the public
190
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may not know why—e.g., whether the disciplinary prosecutors concluded
that the lawyers acted properly, whether authorities thought the wrongdoing
was too insignificant to be charged, or for other reasons.
State disciplinary processes vary in their degree of transparency. As
discussed, the New York process is as opaque as possible, protecting
lawyers’ reputations by keeping complaints, investigations, and proceedings
secret in almost all cases, unless and until a lawyer is publicly sanctioned.193
In general, lawyers prefer secrecy, making it hard to achieve reform.194 The
ABA’s position is that once formal charges are filed and served, disciplinary
proceedings should be made public.195 Even this approach, which many
states have adopted, has been criticized as too opaque.196 Opening up the
process after formal charges are filed gives the public greater insight into
how the process deals with the small number of cases where disciplinary
authorities believe that lawyers have committed misconduct worthy of
punishment. But it still leaves most of the disciplinary process a secret. It
affords no insight into how the disciplinary authorities winnow out most
complaints filed by unhappy clients, opposing parties, lawyers, and others.
Although some jurisdictions, such as New York, publish aggregate and
anonymized information about cases where disciplinary action is not
pursued, the reports leave crucial questions unanswered. There is no way to
know whether, based on an investigation, disciplinary authorities concluded
that no misconduct occurred or whether they decided not to seek discipline
even though the lawyer misbehaved. There is no way to know how often,
and in what circumstances, disciplinary authorities decline to pursue charges
because they conclude that the wrongdoing was minor, harmless, technical,
insubstantial or aberrational; because the lawyer in question was contrite,
was no longer practicing law, or seemed unlikely to reoffend; because the
lawyer had already been sanctioned, formally or informally, so that further
punishment would be undeservedly harsh; because disciplinary proceedings
would be too expensive or time-consuming to pursue; because disciplinary
proceedings would interfere with an ongoing lawsuit, criminal investigation,
or criminal prosecution; because wrongdoing would be hard to prove given
the passage of time or unavailability of witnesses; or for any other reasons.
There would be no way to know whether the reasons not to pursue discipline
193
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were contestable or illegitimate—for example, there would be no way to
know whether disciplinary authorities were making distinctions based on
race, wealth, or status.
The opacity of the process undermines public confidence that
disciplinary prosecutors use their discretion wisely, rather than
discriminatorily, and it ultimately undermines public confidence in the legal
profession’s self-regulation. For example, if no charges are brought in
response to the election litigation, the legal profession will be discredited
even if, on balance, disciplinary authorities were wise to weed out these
cases like others involving frivolous pleadings. Ordinarily, the public is
unaware of frivolous pleadings and other adversary misconduct, but, on this
occasion, the election challenges were in the public spotlight. The public
knows that courts harshly rejected claims of voter fraud and other challenges
and that disciplinary complaints followed.197 If disciplinary authorities
dismiss these allegations, they will have no opportunity to explain why.
Those who favor the disciplinary process’s outcome may assume that it is
well-founded. But those who do not like its outcome, and who received no
explanation, may assume the worst and lose confidence in the law as a
self-regulating profession. Of course, disciplinary prosecutors undoubtedly
regard themselves as independent, like criminal prosecutors. But the public
sees lawyers regulating lawyers, effectively giving scofflaws a pass, in
secret and without any justification. The secrecy reinforces the public
perception—likely undeserved—that the fox is guarding the henhouse but
not doing a conscientious job of it.
Conversely, if disciplinary authorities were required to acknowledge
and explain their discretionary decisions, either in individual cases or in the
aggregate, they would almost certainly make better decisions. It would be
harder to adopt illegitimate decision-making criteria if authorities had to
publicly disclose and justify their criteria, and, once principled criteria were
expressly adopted, they would be more likely to be employed. This is
especially true if decisions in individual cases were acknowledged so that
observers could make their own judgments about whether the charging
decisions accorded with published principles. All of this would help allay
suspicions that the disciplinary authorities are generally under-charging or
that they are sometimes overcharging because of political bias, public
pressure, or other illegitimate considerations. The public and profession
might not agree with every decision. But greater assurance that decisions are
not made arbitrarily or politically would likely boost public confidence in
the regulatory process.
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Finally, transparency would promote public discussion of how
advocates should behave, thereby fostering a better-informed citizenry and
ultimately greater public accountability for disciplinary prosecutors and
courts that delegate authority to them. Consider the post-election litigation
one last time. One question upon which the disciplinary charging decision
may turn is whether, assuming these lawsuits were frivolous, the lawyers’
conduct in filing them was more culpable than that of other lawyers who file
frivolous pleadings. That may depend, to some extent, on the facts of each
individual case. But it also inescapably raises the question of the motivation
behind the lawsuits. Was it worse to bring the cases in support of a political
cause than to bring a frivolous lawsuit for a plaintiff’s personal gain? It is
not inherently wrong to bring litigation to support a political cause. That is,
in fact, common. There is a substantial body of literature recognizing how
litigation may support a political or social movement.198 Of course, it would
be absurd to analogize the post-election litigation to civil rights litigation.
But, assuming that the lawyers in these cases were not seeking to promote a
violent overthrow of government, was it more blameworthy to support
efforts to influence Congress and state officials to change the election results
than, say, to promote a contentious civil-rights cause? Public officials in
charge of lawyer discipline, and courts overseeing them, may decline to
entertain this sort of question, deciding it is better left to the political process.
Alternatively, they may conclude that the anti-democratic nature of the postelection efforts was indisputable, and so obviously culpable, especially for
a lawyer, that it can be identified as an aggravating factor. In an ideal world,
disciplinary authorities might analyze these questions themselves and also
invite the public and the profession to consider them.
CONCLUSION
The public would be enlightened if it were privy to the Arizona, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Texas disciplinary
authorities’ internal deliberations over whether to bring charges against
lawyers for filing frivolous post-election lawsuits.199 There are many
possible considerations, some legitimate and some not, on both sides of the
question. The public would be interested to learn whether disciplinary
authorities are making considered, responsible, and disinterested judgments
198
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in cases like these. Any decisions would be controversial. Declining to bring
charges, perhaps on the view that these cases should be treated no differently
from others where lawyers file frivolous court papers, would disappoint
those who want to see the lawyers punished. Bringing charges, perhaps on
the view that the post-election challenges were particularly egregious,
ill-motivated abuses of the litigation process, would disappoint those who
continue to believe baseless claims that the presidential election was stolen.
The rationales for the discretionary decisions would be analyzed, critiqued,
and challenged. Robust public debate about how the disciplinary process
makes judgments about lawyers’ misconduct would promote a better
understanding of the process and a better-informed view of how well the
process works to protect the public.
However, there will be no flies on the wall because, even in states where
the process is most transparent, disciplinary prosecutors’ discretionary
decision-making is publicly inaccessible. The opacity of the disciplinary
process magnifies problems posed by disciplinary discretion, particularly in
cases of advocacy misconduct, such as when lawyers advance frivolous
positions in court. Although allegations of overzealous advocacy are
commonly raised in litigation, disciplinary authorities rarely charge
advocates who violate disciplinary rules by overzealously pursuing their
clients’ objectives. Their practice is to rely on judges to address misconduct
allegations in litigation where they are, or could be, raised. This practice
raises the questions of: whether the disciplinary codes are overbroad in
incorporating rarely enforced advocacy rules; whether advocates are
under-regulated when their misconduct is overlooked by the disciplinary
process; and whether advocates are being regulated arbitrarily and unfairly
when, as may become true of Giuliani, Powell, and others, they are singled
out for discipline. Because of the lack of transparency, these questions,
although important, are rarely discussed and are not easily answered.
Perhaps that will change. When charges against these lawyers emerge, or
fail to emerge, from state disciplinary processes, the overdue public
discussion of state disciplinary processes may be sparked. Perhaps the very
idea of disciplinary discretion will, as it should, be questioned.
Meanwhile, to promote public and professional accountability,
disciplinary prosecutors should reveal more of their inner processes.
Disciplinary authorities could reveal far more while still preserving the
confidentiality of individual lawyers’ cases. Disciplinary authorities could
disclose the considerations that go into their charging decisions, including
decisions to decline to charge, and disclose how those considerations are
generally weighed in the context of different types of cases.200 Just as
disciplinary authorities’ annual reports now provide aggregate and
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anonymized information focusing on case outcomes, they can provide
aggregated data about charging decisions and anonymized examples of how
charging decisions are made in individual cases. Greater transparency will
encourage more thoughtful and principled decision-making. It will also
foster greater public and professional understanding and discussion. The
disciplinary process’s opacity erodes public confidence in the law as a
self-regulating profession, as the public reaction to the disciplinary
outcomes in the cases of the lawyers who challenged the 2020 presidential
election may come to prove.

